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U.S. bank M&As in the post-Dodd-Frank Act era: 
Do they create value? 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We analyze the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on the shareholder wealth gains using a 
sample of 640 completed U.S. M&As announced between 1990 and 2014. Our results 
indicate a positive DFA effect on announcement period abnormal returns in small bank 
mergers. In fact, mergers with combined firm assets of less than $10 billion create more 
shareholder value after the DFA, than ever before. This positive announcement effect in 
small deals appears to be linked with merger-related compliance cost savings and profitability 
improvements. By examining long-run abnormal returns, we find that the documented DFA 
effect on small deals announcement abnormal returns does not disappear overtime. Finally, 
we do not find such effects for non-U.S. bank M&As over the same period. 
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1. Introduction 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (henceforth the Dodd-
Frank Act or the DFA) was signed into law on July 21, 2010, marking a new epoch of 
financial regulation in response to the 2008 financial crisis. Historically, extensive federal 
regulatory reforms, such as the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 
1999, had produced significant waves of bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Therefore, 
if history repeats itself, we should expect an increase in bank merger activity after the 
enactment of the DFA. 
We use merger data for 640 completed bank mergers announced between 1990 and 2014. 
We observe that small bank mergers experience an increasing trend after the DFA, while 
medium-sized and large deals have yet to reach the pre-crisis levels. We assume that this 
consolidation trend relates to a positive trade-off between synergies and the DFA regulation. 
In fact, banks with less than $10 billion in assets are: (1) inclined to merge to cover the new 
regulatory compliance costs and (2) exempt from the majority of DFA regulations. In this 
case, market participants may perceive small bank mergers as value-creating investments. 
Thus, our main research question is whether the DFA has any effect on shareholder wealth 
gains in U.S. bank mergers, and if so, why. 
To address our research question, we examine shareholder wealth effects for all 640 
mergers and we break down the sample into two sub-periods (pre-DFA, post-DFA), and three 
asset-size categories (small, medium-sized, and large mergers). At a univariate level, we find 
that bidder and combined abnormal returns for small bank M&As are significantly higher 
after the DFA, while in medium-sized and large deals, abnormal returns are not influenced by 
the Act’s passage. Next, in order to compare changes across size groups between the two 
time periods, we conduct difference-in-differences regressions. In this empirical setting, 
small deals constitute the treatment group, since they are the ones affected by the reform, and 
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larger deals are the control group. The results of this analysis provide conclusive evidence 
that the market response for small deals is significantly higher after the DFA compared to 
larger deals, even when we account for factors such as size, geographic diversification, and 
method of payment. 
To ensure that our results are not driven by chance, we consider a series of robustness 
tests. First, we examine whether our inferences from the difference-in-differences analysis 
are sensitive to the “parallel” trends assumption. According to this assumption, abnormal 
returns for our treatment and control groups should follow parallel trends prior to the 
treatment (the DFA). Hence, in the spirit of Almeida et al. (2012), we repeat our difference-
in-differences models using hypothetical treatment periods from the pre-DFA years. The 
insignificant results of this falsification test suggest that the positive effect on small deals 
returns is isolated to periods occurring after the DFA’s enactment. 
We also account for the fact that deals announced before and after the DFA differ 
significantly in their firm- and/or deal-specific characteristics. To tackle this observed 
heterogeneity, we utilize a propensity score matching technique as in Alexandridis et al. 
(2017).  Notably, our matching approach increases the magnitude of the reported DFA effect 
on small bank M&As. On the contrary, the insignificant results for medium-sized and large 
mergers support our argument that deals above the $10 billion mark can be a reliable control 
group in our empirical specification. We also repeat our difference-in-differences regressions 
using the propensity-matched observations, and we find results similar to our baseline 
regressions.  
The second part of our research question refers to the possible explanations behind the 
positive DFA effect on small deals announcement period returns. We argue that under the 
new reform, small bank M&As may be more profitable due to a positive trade-off between 
synergies and the DFA’s regulatory burden. Therefore, we investigate whether small mergers 
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after the DFA have realized any compliance cost savings and profitability improvements, and 
if so, whether these improvements are somehow related to abnormal returns.  
At a first step, we examine the long-run performance of the merging firms of our sample, 
by comparing pre- and post-merger industry-adjusted financial ratios. Our analysis focuses on 
two profitability measures and three compliance costs indicators outlined by Cyree (2016). 
Our preliminary results indicate that after the DFA, the average small merging bank is more 
profitable and realizes significantly higher improvements in the cost of labor relative to the 
average small non-merging bank. At a second step, we use a difference-in-difference-in-
differences approach, and find that after the DFA, small bank mergers outperform their larger 
counterparts, in terms of profitability and per-employee cost of labor. Further, we repeat this 
analysis using the propensity score matching approach. In most cases, comparing post-DFA 
deals with their pre-DFA matched counterparts increases the magnitude of the documented 
performance gains in small deals. 
The most challenging part of this analysis is to find a link between compliance costs, 
profitability, and abnormal returns in small deals. Following the reasoning of Knapp et al. 
(2005), we assume that improvements in compliance costs may be positively related to 
profitability improvements. In this regard, we find that, after the DFA, small mergers are 
more profitable when they achieve significant savings in the per-employee cost of labor. 
Further, in the spirit of DeLong and DeYoung (2007), we examine the relation between 
changes in profitability and announcement period abnormal returns in small deals. Using a 
two-stage regression to address endogeneity concerns as in Dahya et al. (2019), we find that 
more profitable mergers experience higher announcement abnormal returns. 
We present two additional robustness tests to ensure the stability of our results. First, if 
performance improvements are lower than expected, then it is likely that stock prices will be 
adjusted to this unfavorable news (Dutta and Jog, 2009). For this reason, we examine whether 
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the positive DFA effect on small deals announcement returns is followed by a negative 
correction after the merger. Using the approach of Bessembinder and Zhang (2013), we find 
that bidders realize insignificant long-run abnormal returns during the two years after the 
merger, and thus, we assume that the positive effect of the DFA on the announcement period 
abnormal returns does not disappear overtime. 
Second, if the documented improvement in small deals abnormal returns is indeed a DFA 
effect, then it should be evident only in the U.S. market. If this is not the case, then it is likely 
that this observed shift in investors’ behavior relates to other potential influential factors such 
as international economic conditions or the passage of Basel III. Therefore, to account for this 
possibility, we collect a comparable sample of non-U.S. deals over the same period. 
Interestingly, the results indicate that outside the United States, stock markets do not react 
differently to the announcement of a small bank merger.  
Our study is related to the extensive literature on U.S. bank M&As. Cornett and De 
(1991), Houston and Ryngaert (1997), Becher (2000), DeLong (2003), DeLong and 
DeYoung (2007), and Brewer and Jagtiani (2013), among others, use the event study analysis 
to investigate the shareholder wealth effects associated with U.S. bank mergers. Collectively, 
these studies document a wealth transfer from bidder to target firm upon the announcement of 
the merger.  
Our study is also related to the emerging literature that quantifies the impact of the Dodd-
Frank Act on the U.S. financial sector. Balasubramnian and Cyree (2014), Akhigbe et al. 
(2016), and Gao et al. (2018) provide evidence consistent with the DFA’s efficiency in 
addressing the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) problem. Focusing on small community banks, Cyree 
(2016) examines the cost of complying with the DFA regulations and finds that the 
compliance burden for small institutions is significantly increased after the Act’s passage. 
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Finally, Cumming et al. (2019) find that U.S. hedge funds realize lower alphas, after the 
implementation of the DFA. 
Overall, we contribute to the existing literature in three ways. First, we provide a detailed 
analysis of the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on the U.S. bank M&As, and we analyze the 
different effect of the new legislation on small, medium-sized, and large banks, respectively. 
Second, we provide conclusive evidence that after the DFA, small bank M&As create more 
shareholder value than their larger counterparts. Third, we find that after the DFA, small 
deals realize significant improvements in profitability and labor costs, and we link these 
improvements to the documented DFA effect on announcement period abnormal returns. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the key provisions 
of the DFA that are likely to affect bank merger activity for small, medium-sized and large 
banks, respectively. Section 3 details the data collection for the empirical analysis. Section 4 
describes the methodology. Section 5 reports our main empirical results for the abnormal 
returns analysis. Section 6 examines the long-run performance of our sample deals, and links 
performance changes to abnormal returns. Section 7 conducts two main robustness tests to 
evaluate the consistency of our results. Section 8 concludes the paper. 
2. The legislation 
The Dodd-Frank Act is a massive piece of federal regulation (2,319 pages) designated to 
“promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and 
transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer 
by ending bail-outs, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for 
other purposes.” In line with the objective of this paper, we focus on the Act’s provisions that 
are likely to impact the future of the U.S. bank M&As. 
In fact, the new financial reform legislation incorporates a plethora of sections governing 
bank mergers. The DFA imposes new concentration limits and barriers for banks planning to 
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execute a merger. For example, Section 622 of the DFA prohibits a financial company from 
acquiring another institution if the combined firm would control more than 10% of the U.S.-
based aggregate liabilities of all the U.S. financial institutions. Additionally, Section 623 
authorizes regulators not to approve a proposed merger transaction if the resulting depository 
institution would hold more than 10% of all Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) 
deposits. In practice however, it is unlikely that these concentration limits would deter further 
consolidation within the banking industry, because the average bank merger does not even 
approach these asset-size thresholds (Skeel, 2011). 
At the same time, the DFA includes several provisions that do not directly address the 
bank M&A issue, but could reshape the U.S. banking industry in such a way that 
consolidation might be inevitable. The new regulatory regime introduces specific asset-size 
cut-offs ($10 billion, and $50 billion) and imposes strict reforms for banks that exceed these 
thresholds. All these reforms may provide motives or counter-motives for banks to grow 
larger through M&As. At the later parts of this section, we analyze the DFA effect on the 
different groups of banks, as well as the possible relationship between the new legislation and 
bank merger activity in the U.S. Henceforth, we define small, medium-sized, and large banks 
(or mergers), as those banks with total assets (combined firms’ assets) of less than $10 
billion, between $10 billion and $50 billion, and greater than $50 billion, respectively. 
2.1. Small banks under the DFA 
Traditionally, federal regulation has been rather favorable to big banks, since the broad 
principles of financial regulation are the same for all banks, regardless of their size and 
activities. The Dodd-Frank Act attempts a shift from this “one-size-fits-all” approach by 
establishing specific asset-size thresholds tailored to benefit small banks in terms of 
regulatory reforms. As a matter of fact, the majority of the DFA’s regulations include some 
form of exemption for small banks. Out of the 14 major DFA provisions, 13 either include an 
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exemption for small banks or are tailored to provide these institutions with relief from 
specific regulations (Hoskins and Labonte, 2015).  
At first glance, small banks seem to be unaffected from the passage of the Dodd-Frank 
Act. However, the DFA incorporates more than 500 separate rules and mandates governing 
all depository institutions. The implementation of such reforms is associated with increased 
compliance costs. Compliance costs are the costs the bank must bear in order to comply with 
the new regulations, such as: hiring suitable employees, shifting existing employees to 
regulatory compliance tasks, relying on outside compliance experts, time-consuming 
operations by non-specialized employees, etc. Recent empirical evidence suggests that the 
DFA is quite burdensome for small institutions in terms of compliance. Feldman et al. (2013) 
for instance, use data on employees and salaries’ costs to proxy for regulatory compliance in 
small banks. They find that increases in employees and/or salaries relate to significant 
decreases in profitability. In this regard, the 2014 KPMG Community Banking Survey 
(Depman, 2014) indicates that 45% of community banks estimate compliance costs in the 
scale of 5-10% of total operating costs. In this survey also, employee expenses constitute a 
significant portion of the total compliance costs. Cyree (2016) estimates compliance costs for 
small U.S. banks around major crisis-based regulatory reforms, using measures of profit, 
labour costs, and productivity as indicators of regulatory compliance costs. His results 
suggest that the Dodd-Frank Act was the most burdensome reform for small banks, compared 
to previous regulatory changes. In a more recent survey, Dahl et al. (2018) report that 
compliance costs averaged 7% of non-interest expenses in small banks. The authors highlight 
that labour costs account for the vast majority of the reported compliance costs. 
2.2. Medium-sized banks under the DFA 
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, banks that exceed $10 billion in assets are subject to a many 
activity-based restrictions. More precisely, Title X of the DFA requires the establishment of 
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the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). The CFPB is an independent executive 
agency within the Federal Reserve, authorized to promote consumer financial protection. The 
new Bureau has unprecedented autonomy in issuing new rules and exclusive regulatory 
authority on consumer protection issues. The principal focus of the Bureau is to monitor 
mortgage and credit card-related issues in financial institutions with more than $10 billion in 
assets. Title X also incorporates Section 1075, commonly known as the Durbin Amendment. 
Under this section, banks that exceed the $10 billion threshold face a cap on debit card 
interchange transaction fees. Lastly, section 165 of the Act requires banks with total 
consolidated assets of more than $10 billion to conduct annual stress tests to determine 
whether they have the necessary capital to absorb potential losses emanating from adverse 
economic conditions. Therefore, all these DFA provisions are applicable to medium-sized 
and large banks and they effectively single out small institutions. 
2.3. Large banks under the DFA 
For banks that exceed $50 billion in assets, the DFA imposes even stricter regulatory 
requirements. Title I of the DFA establishes a new powerful regulatory body; the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). The main purpose of the FSOC is to identify potential 
risks to the stability of the U.S. financial system associated with large bank holding 
companies (BHCs) or non-bank financial companies. The Council focuses primarily on 
BHCs and non-bank financial institutions that hold more than $50 billion in assets. The 
institutions that exceed this threshold are considered systemically important financial 
institutions (SIFIs), and are subject to increased prudential, capital, and liquidity standards. 
Hence, the DFA has provided an official asset-size threshold for a financial institution to be 
designated as systemically important or TBTF. 
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2.4. Merging activity and the DFA 
The DFA regulatory costs influence banks of all sizes, but in different ways. In relative terms, 
compliance costs are more burdensome to small banks, since these institutions have less 
capacity for regulatory compliance relative to their larger rivals. In fact, relative compliance 
costs increase as bank size decreases (Dahl et al., 2018). Consequently, it is likely that small 
banks will be inclined to merge in order to distribute these compliance costs over a higher 
output level. In this respect, Aiello and Tarbert (2010), and Marsh (2015) argue that the 
imposition of the DFA compliance costs on small banks would dictate these institutions to 
consolidate or go out of business. In accordance with these arguments, Peirce et al. (2014) 
surveyed 200 small banks in their study, and reported that more than 25% of these banks 
were contemplating M&A strategies to adjust to the DFA compliance costs.  
As mentioned above, the DFA has a different effect on medium-sized and large 
institutions. It is reasonably that medium-sized and large banks will commit fewer resources 
for regulatory compliance than small banks, as a proportion to their overall revenues. For this 
reason, these institutions might be less tempted to merge with the intention to spread the DFA 
compliance costs over a larger asset base. Moreover, under the Dodd-Frank Act, banks that 
exceed specific asset-size thresholds ($10 billion and $50 billion respectively) are subject to 
enhanced prudential standards and activity-based restrictions, which are designated to limit 
their excessively risky (and highly profitable) activities. Contrary to compliance costs, the 
costs of these reforms could not be absorbed by getting larger, since the restrictions increase 
with size. Thus, as banks grow larger beyond the specified thresholds, the trade-off between 
synergies and the cost of regulation may not be particularly lucrative to provide these firms 
with additional incentives for M&As. 
  
 10 
 
2.5. The DFA effect on announcement period returns 
The stock market reaction at the announcement of a merger reflects the investors’ perception 
about the value created or destroyed by the merger (DeYoung et al., 2009). Value-creating 
mergers should provide a positive trade-off between merger-related financial gains and costs. 
In this regard, the DFA may have benefited small bank mergers in two ways: (1) mergers 
between small banks may achieve significant economies of scale through compliance cost 
savings, and (2) banks with less than $10 billion in assets are subject to many regulatory 
exemptions, which provide these institutions with a competitive advantage against their larger 
rivals. Following these arguments, we expect a positive trade-off between economies of scale 
and the cost of regulation for small bank mergers, and thus, we predict higher abnormal 
returns for these deals post-DFA. In contrast, we do not expect a similar effect on mergers 
between larger institutions because: (1) as banks grow larger, they have higher capacity for 
regulatory compliance (and thus they offer fewer opportunities for economies of scale), and 
(2) after the $10 billion mark, activity-based restrictions increase with size. For these reasons, 
it is likely that any merger-related cost savings would be inadequate to offset the cost of the 
new regulations for medium sized, and especially for large institutions. Hence, we do not 
predict any significant improvements in announcement period abnormal returns for these 
deals. 
3. Sample description and statistics 
3.1. Merger sample 
Our bank M&As data is collected from the Thomson ONE database. Mergers are manually 
confirmed against the National Information Center (NIC) database.
1
 We use the following 
five criteria to obtain the initial sample: 
                                                          
1
 We make some corrections on the initial sample obtained by Thomson ONE database. For example, in the 
merger of Peoples Federal Bancshares, Inc. with Independent Bank Corp., Thomson ONE reports an incorrect 
acquirer. Following NIC, the correct acquirer is the Independent Bank Corp. (with ticker INDB) headquartered 
 11 
 
1. Both bidders and targets are commercial banks and savings institutions with a three-
digit primary SIC codes equal to 602 and 603, respectively, or bank holding 
companies with a four-digit primary SIC code equal to 6712.
2
 
2. The announcement of the merger is between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2014. 
3. Both bidders and targets are U.S. public firms listed on NYSE, Amex, or Nasdaq. 
4. The bidder acquired an interest of above 50% in a target, raising its interest from 
below 50% to above 50%.
3
 
5. All deals are completed. 
The criteria result in an initial sample of 670 bank mergers. From this sample we exclude 19 
mergers, because stock return data were available on the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) for either the bidder or the target firm, but the data ends before the 
announcement date. We also exclude 2 mergers due to the fact that both targets were 
incorrectly classified as publicly traded firms on the Thomson ONE database.
4
 In line with 
Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011), we also exclude 8 mergers which involved failing 
institutions, as reported by Thomson ONE (Cowan and Salotti, 2015). One additional merger 
was removed due to the fact that the bidder experienced extraordinary returns at the 
announcement date, distorting the calculation of the average abnormal returns.
5
 The final 
sample consists of 640 mergers, where 557 of the deals were announced in the pre-DFA 
period, and the remaining 83 mergers were announced after the Act’s enactment on July 21, 
2010.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
in Massachusetts. Thomson ONE reports the Independent Bank Corp. (with ticker IBCP) headquartered in 
Michigan as the acquiring firm. 
2
 CommerceFirst Bancorp, Inc. has been assigned with a target primary four-digit SIC code of 6011 in the 
Thomson ONE database. NIC reports that the company operates as a BHC. We therefore include the merger of 
CommerceFirst Bancorp, Inc. with Sandy Spring Bancorp, Inc. in our sample. 
3
 In line with the literature, we exclude leveraged buyouts, minority stake purchases, acquisitions of remaining 
interest, privatizations, recapitalizations, spin-offs, repurchases, exchange offers, and self-tender offers. 
4
 Thomson ONE reports The Bancorp, Inc. (with ticker TBBK) headquartered in Delaware and Enterprise 
Bancorp, Inc. (with ticker EBTC) headquartered in Massachusetts as the target firms. Both reported institutions 
are listed on the Nasdaq. However, the actual deals involve two unlisted targets; The Bancorp, Inc., 
headquartered in Kentucky, and Enterprise Bancorp, Inc., headquartered in Florida. 
5
 FNB United Corp. experienced an abnormal return of 60.07% on the announcement day. 
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3.2. Evolution of bank mergers overtime 
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of U.S. bank M&As from 1990 to 2014 for small, medium-
sized, and large mergers respectively. During the 1990s, a period characterized by intense 
banking deregulation (Riegle-Neal Act of 1994, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999), the U.S. 
banking industry underwent dramatic consolidation. As shown in the figure, the number of 
deals follows an upward trend in the first half of the decade for all three types of mergers. 
Notably, merger activity for small and medium-sized mergers skyrocketed in the late 1990s. 
In the early 2000s, the level of banking consolidation was slightly decreased, although the 
industry experienced a peak in M&As deals in 2004. The bank merger activity then 
plummeted, as a result of the 2008 financial crisis. 
Historically, regulatory intervention has been a chief motivation for consolidation within 
the banking industry. Interestingly, after the DFA’s enactment in the end of 2010, we observe 
that the number of small bank mergers exhibits an increasing trend. Data for the medium-size 
mergers suggest that M&As activity has started to rebound, despite the fact that the annual 
number of deals has yet to reach the pre-crisis levels. On the other hand, large bank mergers 
are on their lowest point since the late 1990s. Overall, as shown in Figure 1, small banks have 
become more acquisitive after the DFA. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
3.3. Summary statistics 
Table 1 illustrates the distribution of the merging firms’ total assets at year-end prior to the 
merger announcement. We classify our sample into three categories based on our two size 
thresholds ($10 billion, and $50 billion). Panels A and B partition the sample based on 
whether the merger was announced before or after the DFA. Further, we report summary 
statistics for the bidder, target and combined firm’s total assets for both sub-periods.  
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Before the DFA, 49.37% of bidding firms were below the $10 billion mark (275 out of 
557), while after the DFA, small bidders constitute the 73.49% of the sample (61 out of 83). 
The difference in proportions of small bidders between the two sub-periods is statistically 
significant at the 1% level, using a Chi-square test (χ2 = 16.83). In both periods, small banks 
dominate the sample of target firms: 89.59% before the DFA (499 out of 557), and 95.18% 
after the DFA (79 out of 83). Small mergers in the pre-DFA period are less than half of the 
sample (255 out of 557 or 45.78%), whereas in the post-DFA period, the majority of bank 
M&As fall in the small-sized category (55 out of 83 or 66.27%). Again, the difference in 
proportions of small mergers between the two sub-periods is statistically significant at the 1% 
level (χ2 = 12.11). These findings reinforce our argument that small bank M&As are more 
frequent corporate events after the Act’s enactment. 
Insert Table 1 here 
Table 2 displays summary statistics for our whole sample. We partition the sample based 
on whether the merger was announced before or after the Act’s enactment. The last column 
of Table 2 reports differences in means and medians between these two sub-periods. Panel A 
of Table 2 illustrates the statistics for firm-specific variables. The dispersion of asset-size and 
return on assets (ROA) among bidders and targets is in line with the extant literature. The 
average bidder is substantially larger and more profitable than the average target both before 
and after the DFA. In addition, after the DFA, bidding banks are significantly smaller, while 
both bidders and targets are less profitable and better capitalized, which is consistent with the 
low-profitability environment of the post-crisis period and the increased capital requirements 
of the new regulatory regime. 
Panel B of Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for deal-specific variables. Deal values in 
the post-DFA period are smaller by approximately $1 billion, and the difference between the 
two sub-periods is statistically significant at 10% level. We also observe that on average, 
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acquisition premiums do not differ after the DFA. Days to completion is the time interval 
between the announcement and the completion date, and serves as the proxy for merger 
complexity (Becher and Campbell, 2005). We find that deals in the post-DFA era took a 
significant longer time to be completed than deals announced before the Act’s passage. We 
could offer several possible explanations for this latter finding. For example, due diligence 
process in the post-crisis years may be more time-consuming, due to increased opacity in 
target bank’s assets. Alternatively, this difference may reflect the more stringent regulatory 
environment for bank M&As in the post-DFA period.  In terms of method of payment, stock 
financing was the prevailing choice before the DFA, while after the DFA, bidders prefer to 
pay with a combination of stock and cash. Lastly, the percentages of deals between banks that 
are headquartered in the same state suggest an equally divided distribution between intrastate 
and interstate mergers throughout the whole examination period. 
Insert Table 2 here 
4. Methodology 
We employ both univariate and multivariate approaches in order to investigate whether the 
DFA has altered the way market participants view U.S. bank M&As: (1) we compute bidder, 
target, and combined cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date for the 
whole sample of 640 mergers and for the two separate sub-periods (Pre-DFA, and Post-
DFA), and we breakdown these samples using two asset-size cutoffs ($10 billion, and $50 
billion), (2) we estimate single-differences and difference-in-differences (DD) regression 
models, to examine the effect of the DFA on announcement period returns, after controlling 
for firm- and deal- specific characteristics.  
4.1. Announcement abnormal returns 
We employ the standard event study methodology outlined in Brown and Warner (1985). We 
use the OLS method to estimate the parameters of the following market model: 
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, , ,i t i i m t i tR a R         (1) 
where the dependent variable Ri,t is the daily market return for stock i, Rm,t  is the daily return 
on the CRSP NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq value-weighted index (with dividends), and t = (−200, 
−21) indexes days prior to the announcement of the merger.6 We estimate the daily abnormal 
returns for each firm as follows: 
    , , ,ˆˆi t i t i i m tAR R a R        (2) 
where ARi,t is the abnormal return for the firm i on day t, ˆˆ ,i i  are the OLS estimates of the 
intercept and market beta coefficient, respectively. To construct the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs), we sum the estimated daily abnormal returns from one day before the 
announcement to one day after the announcement date.
7
 To calculate combined abnormal 
returns, we follow Houston and Ryngaert (1994), and we construct a hypothetical value 
weighted portfolio for each bidder-target pair (i = 1 to 640): 
  



B B T T
i i i i
B T
i i
MV CAR MV CAR
Combined CAR
MV MV
    (3) 
where 
B
iMV  and 
T
iMV  are the market values of equity for the bidder and target i five days 
before the merger announcement date, and 
B
iCAR  and 
T
iCAR  are the cumulative abnormal 
returns for each ith bidder and target pair. 
DeLong (2001) suggests that this static approach could severely under- or over-estimate 
the combined CARs, because changes in the market value of equity for each bidder-target 
pair may be asymmetric. To ensure robustness of our reported results we also employ her 
                                                          
6
 As a robustness check, we compute abnormal returns using the market adjusted return model, the mean 
adjusted returns model, and the market model with the Scholes-Williams beta estimation. We also repeat the 
analysis using the CRSP NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq equal-weighted index (with dividends) as the benchmark index. 
Finally, according to the literature, we use other estimation periods (−300, −51) and (−120, −31). The results 
obtained are similar to those presented. 
7
 We also compute cumulative abnormal returns for other event windows (−5 days to +1 days, −10 days to +1 
days, and −10 days to +10 days). The results were similar. 
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proposed methodology by constructing a hypothetical portfolio of the two merging firms and 
calculating its return as follows: 
, ,
, 1 , 1
ln
 
 
    
B T
i t i tp
t B T
i t i t
MV MV
R
MV MV
     (4) 
where p
tR is the return of the hypothetical portfolio p at day t, and ,
B
i tMV , ,
T
i tMV , , 1
B
i tMV  and 
, 1
T
i tMV  denote the market value of equity of bidder and target i at days t and t−1, 
respectively. Then, we use the return of the hypothetical portfolio (as it was a single firm) in 
equation (1) to estimate market model estimates, in order to compute its daily abnormal 
returns using equation (2). Both approaches produced qualitatively similar results. 
Finally, to determine statistical significance, we use the standardized cross-sectional test of 
Boehmer et al. (1991). The test compensates for possible variance increases in abnormal 
returns, commonly found on event dates. Further, to account for the non-normal distribution 
of the security returns, we test the statistical significance of the estimated CARs by using a 
non-parametric test, the rank test outlined by Corrado (1989). This test has the advantage that 
makes inferences less sensitive to outliers. 
4.2. Difference-in-differences estimation 
The difference-in-differences approach is typically used to estimate the effects of specific 
policy interventions or policy changes (such as a passage of a law) on a group of people or 
firms that are directly treated by these changes (Lechner, 2011). In fact, the DD approach 
compares changes overtime in a group of subjects affected by the policy change to changes 
overtime in a group of subjects unaffected by the policy change, and attributes this 
“difference-in-differences” to the effect of the policy. The group that is affected by the policy 
change is referred to as “treatment group”, and the unaffected group as “control group”. 
Based on our research question, we presume that the treatment group in our case is the small 
bank M&As, while the control group consists of both medium-sized and large mergers. 
 17 
 
To gauge the magnitude of the DFA on abnormal returns, we employ two different model 
specifications. In each specification, the dependent variable is the bidder, target, or combined 
three-day CARs, centered on the announcement date. In the first specification, we examine 
whether abnormal returns for the whole sample are improved after the DFA using a single-
differences approach: 
2 3 , 1, 4 ,1 ,i t i t i ti t DFA Small X ZCAR a           (5) 
where DFA is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the merger announcement day was after the 
DFA’s enactment, and 0 otherwise, and Small is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
combined firms’ consolidated assets are less than $10 billion, and 0 otherwise. Xi,t−1 and Zi,t 
denote bank- and deal-specific variables, respectively (defined in the Appendix).
8
 In this 
specification, the coefficient of interest, β1, measures whether abnormal returns are 
significantly changed after the DFA for the whole sample. We expect β1 to be insignificant, 
since we assume that the DFA affects abnormal returns only in small deals. 
In the second specification, we examine whether abnormal returns for our treatment group 
differ significantly from the abnormal returns of our control group after the DFA. This 
difference-in-differences approach is estimated using the following model:  
2 3 4 , 1 5 ,1 ,, i t t tt ii iDFA Small DFACAR S alla m X Z             (6) 
In this specification, the interaction term between DFA and Small constitutes the DD 
estimator. Therefore, to address our research question, we expect to find a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient for β3. 
The advantage of this regression-based approach is that it allows us to compare CARs 
between comparison groups across time periods, while controlling for observable differences 
in firm- and deal-specific characteristics. As we show in Table 2, the characteristics of bidder 
and target banks differ significantly before and after the DFA. Therefore, controlling for 
                                                          
8
 All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. In all our models, we report heteroskedasticity-
robust t-statistics. 
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these differences gives us a more robust estimate for the potential impact of the DFA on 
announcement period abnormal returns. 
5. Main empirical results 
5.1. Cumulative abnormal returns 
In this section, we report bidder, target, and combined firms announcement CARs for the 
whole sample of 640 mergers. Further, we partition the sample into small, medium-sized, and 
large bank mergers, and we investigate whether abnormal returns differ significantly before 
and after the Dodd-Frank Act. As is typical in the literature, we focus primarily on bidder and 
combined CARs, although we also report results for target firms. 
Panel A of Table 3 reports results for the whole sample. Over the whole period, bidder and 
target announcement CARs are in line with the existing bank M&As literature. Bidders 
experience negative and statistically significant abnormal returns, whereas targets experience 
positive and statistically significant abnormal returns, according to both the parametric and 
the non-parametric tests (Trifts and Scanlon, 1987; Hannan and Wolken, 1989; Cornett and 
De, 1991; Houston and Ryngaert, 1997; DeLong, 2003; DeLong and DeYoung, 2007). In 
addition, combined CARs for the whole period indicate a modest value creation in the scale 
of 0.90% (Becher, 2000). By looking at the next two columns of Panel A, we find that this 
pattern in abnormal returns persists both before and after the DFA. However, target and 
combined CARs are significantly higher after the Act’s enactment. 
Panels B, C, and D, report results for the sub-samples of small, medium-sized, and large 
mergers, respectively. In the pre-DFA period, bidder and target CARs in all three categories 
are in line with what reported for the whole sample. Combined CARs are positive and 
statistically significant in small deals, but insignificant in both medium-sized and large deals. 
In the post-DFA period, we document a substantial improvement in abnormal returns for 
small deals. Now, bidder CARs are indistinguishable from zero, which suggests that after the 
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DFA, bidders in small mergers experience a mean 1.25% higher abnormal return, relative to 
the pre-DFA years. This mean difference between the two periods is statistically significant at 
the 10% level. Furthermore, combined CARs are also significantly higher after the DFA. In 
particular, combined CARs for the 55 small deals are 3.44%, and statistically significant at 
the 1% level. In economic terms, this figure implies a shareholder value creation of $23.09 
million for the average merger. The difference between the two periods is in the order of 
1.85%, and statistically significant at the 1% level. On the contrary, results for medium-sized 
and large deals suggest that both bidder and combined CARs do not improve after the DFA. 
Finally, target firms in all cases (except large mergers) experience statistically higher 
abnormal returns after the passage of the Act. 
Insert Table 3 here 
The results of the univariate analysis are important in two ways. First, these findings 
provide preliminary evidence that abnormal returns in small bank M&As are indeed 
significantly higher after the DFA. Second, the fact that medium-sized and large mergers are 
not affected by the passage of the legislation supports our conjecture that these deals can 
serve as the control group in our DD analysis. 
5.2. Difference-in-differences results 
In Table 4, we present the results of the single-differences and the difference-in-differences 
regression models. Models 1, 3, and 5 report the estimated coefficients of the single-
differences regressions (equation 5). We find that bidder and combined CARs are not 
affected by the passage of the law, a finding which supports our argument that the DFA does 
not influence returns in all types of deals. On the contrary, consistent with the univariate 
analysis, target CARs are approximately 10.3% higher after the DFA. Models 2, 4, and 6 
report the results of the DD regressions (equation 6). We observe that the inclusion of the 
interaction variable significantly changes our results. Bidder and combined CARs in small 
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bank mergers are significantly higher after the DFA, compared to larger deals. More 
precisely, bidders in small bank mergers experience a mean 2.2% larger abnormal return after 
the DFA, while combined CARs are also 1.9% higher. In both cases, the DD estimator is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. These findings not only support the preliminary 
findings of the univariate analysis, but also indicate that comparing CARs between small and 
larger deals across the two sub-periods increases the magnitude of the DFA effect on small 
deals returns. Conversely, we do not find similar evidence for the target firms of our sample. 
As we have seen at the univariate level, target abnormal returns increase in both small and 
medium-sized mergers post-DFA. It is therefore reasonable that the DD estimator is not 
statistically significant in this case. Lastly, to ensure that our results are not driven by the 
choice of the examination period, we repeat the analysis with the examination period starting 
from 1995 or 2000. In both cases, the results remained unchanged. 
A handful of our control variables bear statistically significant coefficients in our model 
specifications. We observe that equity payments translate to lower bidder and combined 
abnormal returns (Travlos, 1987). In addition, Relative Size is positively associated with 
combined CARs (Becher and Campbell, 2005; Brewer and Jagtiani, 2013). In the regressions 
of target abnormal returns, the coefficients for Relative Size and State are negative and 
statistically significant in both models (DeLong, 2003). Finally, less capitalized targets 
realize lower abnormal returns. This finding might imply that bidders pay lower premiums 
for targets with depleted levels of capital. 
Insert Table 4 here 
A possible concern is that the inclusion of the crisis period in the pre-DFA sub-sample 
might bias downwards abnormal returns for this period and inflate the DFA effect. For this 
reason, we repeat our analysis by excluding all deals announced from the third quarter of 
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2007 until the first quarter of 2009 (Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2015). Our findings remain 
the same. 
5.3. Is the difference-in-differences estimator valid? 
One major concern about inferences from studies that use the DD methodology is whether the 
treated and control groups followed “common or parallel” trends prior to the treatment. In the 
post-treatment period, any difference between the two groups can only be assigned to the 
treatment if this “parallel trends” assumption holds (Roberts and Whited, 2013). In this 
regard, we should test whether abnormal returns between small and larger mergers followed 
similar trends prior to the DFA. To do so, we follow the approach of Almeida et al. (2012), 
and we re-run the DD regressions of equation (6) using data only from the pre-treatment 
period (pre-DFA). To replicate our empirical specification, we use several hypothetical 
treatment periods, and we expect the DD estimator to be insignificant in all cases. 
Table 5 reports the DD estimated coefficients of equation (6) for the several variations in 
our empirical specification. In each row, we use a different hypothetical treatment period. For 
example, the first row reports the estimated DD coefficient from a model where the treatment 
period begins in 2006 and ends right before the DFA’s enactment. The first hypothetical 
treatment period starts from 2006, in order to have a comparable number of treated 
observations with the actual post-DFA sample. The last two columns of Table 5 report the 
total number of deals in pre-treatment and post-treatment period, respectively. In all cases, 
the total number of observations equals 557. As in Table 4, the dependent variable in each 
model is the bidder, target, or combined three-day announcement CARs. In all specifications, 
the DD estimator is indistinguishable from zero, which suggests that abnormal returns in 
small bank mergers do not increase (or decrease) compared to larger deals, after each 
hypothetical treatment period. Based on these findings, it is difficult to assume that abnormal 
returns between small and larger mergers were following very different trends prior to the 
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DFA. Certainly, this fact strengthens our argument that the observed change in market 
reaction towards small deals is more likely due to the DFA, as opposed to some alternative 
force. 
Insert Table 5 here 
5.4. CARs based on propensity score matching 
Roberts and Whited (2013) suggest that the inclusion of controls in a DD regression helps 
accounting for observable differences between comparison groups, and improves the validity 
of the DD estimator. However, as shown by Heckman et al. (1998), incorporating control 
variables in a regression does not always account for these differences in observable 
characteristics. One possible solution to this problem is the use of matching methods (Li and 
Prabhala, 2007). 
From the summary statistics reported in Table 2, we observe that post-DFA deals differ 
significantly from pre-DFA deals. Hence, to control more directly for these differences, we 
use a propensity score matching (PSM) technique, in the spirit of Alexandridis et al. (2017). 
This PSM approach finds similar matches of post-DFA deals to pre-DFA deals and then 
compares their abnormal returns. The similarity between the two sub-periods is based on 
firm- and deal-specific characteristics such as size, method of payment, and geographic 
diversification. 
To implement the propensity score matching technique, we run several probit models to 
estimate the probability of each deal to be announced after the DFA (propensity score). We 
estimate a probit model for the whole sample of 640 deals, as well as for the three separate 
sub-samples, small, medium-sized, and large mergers, respectively, in order to compare the 
results of the PSM analysis with the univariate results of Table 3. In these models, we use all 
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the control variables of Table 4.
9
 After estimating the propensity scores, we match the deals 
using the nearest neighbor matching approach (one-to-one).
10
 Finally, we compare the 
difference in mean CARs between deals announced after the DFA and their PSM-matched 
pre-DFA counterparts. This difference is commonly referred to as the average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT). 
Panel A of Table 6 presents the results of the probit models. Model 1 presents the results 
for the whole sample. We observe that several variables are significant in determining the 
probability for a deal to be announced after the DFA. Actually, post-DFA deals are less likely 
to be geographically-focused and financed entirely with cash. In line with previous findings, 
small deals are more likely events after the DFA. In addition, post-DFA deals are more likely 
to be materialized over a longer time period, and target firms after the DFA tend to be more 
capitalized. By breaking down the sample based on our asset-size cutoffs, we obtain different 
results. For instance, in small post-DFA deals, bidders are more likely to be larger than their 
pre-DFA counterparts, while in medium-sized deals, we find the opposite result. Further, 
small deals after the DFA are more likely to be financed with a combination of cash and 
stock, and medium-sized deals after the DFA are less likely to be intrastate. In both cases, 
target capitalization is positively-related to the probability of being a post-DFA deal. Lastly, 
in all three sub-samples, Days to Completion bears a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient. 
Panel B of Table 6 reports the ATTs produced by the propensity score matching 
technique. Initially, for the whole sample, only target abnormal returns are significantly 
higher after the DFA. However, in the small mergers sub-sample, the PSM approach 
produces compelling results. In fact, bidder CARs are now 3.22% higher after the DFA, a 
                                                          
9
 We exclude Roadiff from the probit model, because its inclusion worsens the quality of matching between pre-
DFA, and post-DFA deals.  
10
 As in Alexandridis et al. (2017), we also match using more than one nearest neighbors, as well as using the 
Gaussian kernel matching approach. In each case, we match both with and without replacement. All methods 
produce virtually identical results. The reported results are based on matching with replacement. 
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difference which is statistically significant at the 1% level. Target and combined CARs are 
also significantly higher after the DFA. Their differences are equal to 15.52% and 3.75%, 
respectively (both statistically significant at the 1% level). Notice that all three differences are 
substantially higher from what reported on Table 3. Therefore, the findings of the PSM 
analysis indicate that small bank mergers after the DFA outperform very similar deals from 
the pre-DFA period. In contrast, the evidence for the medium-sized and large mergers is 
similar to what reported at the univariate level, since bidder and combined CARs do not 
differ before and after the DFA. These results suggest that deals above the $10 billion mark 
are untreated by the DFA, and thus, they comprise a credible control group for our DD 
analysis. 
Insert Table 6 here 
It is worth mentioning that the consistency of the PSM methodology depends on its ability 
to balance the distribution of the potentially confounding characteristics between the 
comparison groups. In untabulated analysis, we compare mean values between post-DFA 
deals and their pre-DFA matched counterparts for the whole sample, as well as for the three 
separate subsamples. We do not find any significant differences in means, which suggests 
that groups being compared are adequately balanced. 
Moving a step further, we replicate our DD analysis of Table 4 using propensity-matched 
deals in the spirit of Almeida et al. (2012). Given that the results of the PSM analysis confirm 
that only small deals are influenced by the DFA, we use the same treatment and control 
groups as in the original DD analysis. Hence, we match the post-DFA observations of our 
treatment and control groups with their pre-DFA counterparts, utilizing the controls reported 
in Table 6. Then, we estimate again equations (5) and (6) using the propensity-matched 
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observations as the pre-DFA sub-sample.
11
 We identify 68 unique, matched observations 
from the pre-DFA period, since matching is done with replacement.
12
 Table 7 reports 
noteworthy results. In fact, the matched-DD estimator suggests that bidder and combined 
CARs in small deals are now 3.4% and 3.2% higher after the DFA, compared to larger deals. 
In view of these results, we argue that the documented DFA effect on small deals returns 
should be relatively robust, since the PSM technique accounts for the self-selection bias 
associated with deals’ propensity to be announced after the DFA. 
Insert Table 7 here 
6. The DFA effect on performance 
In our analysis so far, we have established that abnormal returns in small bank mergers are 
significantly higher after the DFA. Market returns however are forward-looking measures of 
the expected merger gains, and as such, they do not capture the actual changes in financial 
performance over longer horizons. At this point therefore, it is still questionable whether 
small bank M&As have indeed resulted in performance improvements, and if so, whether 
these improvements are somehow related to the documented DFA effect on announcement 
period abnormal returns. The goal of this section is to address these concerns by finding a 
link between compliance costs, profitability, and abnormal returns in small bank mergers. 
6.1. Performance changes around M&As 
Initially, we measure the long-run change in the overall financial performance of the merging 
banks, using two profitability indicators: pre-tax ROA and pre-tax ROE (Houston et al., 
2001). Further, we also examine merger-related improvements in performance by analyzing 
changes in several compliance costs indicators, using data on salaries and loans. Decreases in 
the cost of labor and increases in the loan output are associated with lower compliance costs 
(Cyree, 2016). For the cost of labor, we use two measures: average pay (Pay), which is 
                                                          
11
 We use controls in the matched-DD specification to account for differences between small and larger deals. 
Without their inclusion, we obtain similar results. 
12
 Matching with no replacement produced virtually identical results. 
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defined as total salaries to total number of employees, and salaries-to-assets (Sal). Total loans 
are also scaled by the number of employees (Loan). We conjecture that significant changes in 
these compliance costs indicators may have an impact on the post-merger financial 
performance of the merging firms. 
In line with DeLong and DeYoung (2007), we follow a four step procedure to estimate 
changes in performance of the merging banks. First, to measure pre-merger performance, we 
collect data on the performance variables for both bidders and targets at the year-end prior to 
the merger announcement. Then, we combine these data for a hypothetical combined bank, 
and we calculate hypothetical pre-merger performance as the weighted average of values for 
each bidder-target pair. The weights are the relative sizes of the two merging banks at year-
end prior to the merger announcement, as measured by the book value of assets (Cornett et 
al., 2006). Second, we measure post-merger performance as the performance of the actual 
combined bank two calendar years after the pre-merger performance year (Houston et al., 
2001).
13
 Third, to account for industry trends, we adjust pre- and post-merger performance to 
the same-year mean performance of non-merging banks (Cornett et al., 2006).
14
 Non-merging 
banks are also classified into small, medium-sized, and large banks. Hence, the industry-
adjusted performance is the difference between the performance of the merging banks of a 
size category and the performance of the non-merging banks of the same size category. 
Fourth, we compute the change in performance as the difference between the post-merger 
industry-adjusted performance and the pre-merger industry-adjusted performance.
15
  
                                                          
13
 We repeat the same procedure for three years after the pre-merger performance year. The results are similar, 
but we lose 37 observations (32 in the pre-DFA period, 5 in the post-DFA period) due to unavailability of data.  
14
 Non-merging banks of the pre-DFA (post-DFA) period are those banks that did not engage in mergers before 
(after) the DFA. For robustness, we also define non-merging banks of the year t as those banks that did not 
engage in mergers from the year t−1 to the year t +1. The results are similar. 
15
 From the whole sample of 640 mergers, we lose 56 observations due to the fact that some bidders went 
bankrupt after the merger, or they became acquisition targets. From the remaining 584 deals, we obtain data for 
either 584 observations (pre-tax ROA, pre-tax ROE, and Sal) or 378 observations (Pay and Loan). The 
difference between the two sets of variables is due to the lack of data for the number of employees. 
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In Table 8, we report changes in all industry-adjusted performance indicators around 
merger announcements. Next, we compute differences in these changes in two dimensions. 
First, we estimate the differences in performance changes for each asset-size category across 
the two time periods. We do this to quantify the DFA effect on performance in each separate 
type of mergers (small, medium-sized, and large mergers). Second, we estimate the 
differences in performance changes between small and larger deals in either the pre- or the 
post-DFA period. This difference is a DD estimate, and tests whether the changes in 
performance differ significantly between small and larger deals in either the pre- or the post-
DFA period. The difference of the DD estimate of the post-DFA period minus the DD 
estimate of the pre-DFA period constitutes a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) 
estimate. The DDD estimate allows us to simultaneously compare the changes in 
performance between small and larger deals across the two time periods, and as such, it 
shows the effect of the DFA on the performance changes of the two groups. 
Panel A of Table 8 reports mean changes in overall financial performance for each size 
category. As we can see in column (2), the DFA has a positive effect on the small merger 
financial performance. In fact, profitability in small deals is significantly higher after the 
DFA both in terms of pre-tax ROA and pre-tax ROE. This means that the average small 
merging bank improves its profitability after the DFA more than the average small non-
merging bank. On the contrary, in medium-sized deals, Δpre-tax ROA is significantly 
decreased after the DFA, while Δpre-tax ROE is negative and significant both before and 
after the DFA, albeit the difference between the two periods is insignificant. The results for 
large deals do not indicate any significant difference between the two periods. Furthermore, 
the DD estimate of column (5) suggests that in the pre-DFA period, both small and larger 
(both medium-sized and large deals) mergers realize virtually the same changes in 
profitability, while in the post-DFA period, small bank mergers outperform larger deals. As a 
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result, the DDD estimate of column (6) indicates that after the DFA, small bank mergers are 
significantly more profitable compared to larger deals. 
Panel B of Table 8 reports changes in the industry-adjusted compliance costs indicators for 
each size category. Interestingly, ΔPay is significantly decreased after the DFA in small 
mergers, which suggests that small bank mergers realize higher savings in their per-employee 
cost of labour relative to the small non-merging banks. In medium-sized deals, the difference 
in ΔPay between the two periods is insignificant, while large deals exhibit a significant 
increase in the cost of labour. During the pre-DFA period, ΔPay is significantly higher for 
small deals compared to larger deals. In the post-DFA period though, this difference 
disappears. Subsequently, the DDD estimator is negative and significant, suggesting that after 
the DFA, small bank mergers realize higher improvements in the per-employee cost of 
labour, relative to larger deals. ΔSal is also significantly decreased during the DFA period in 
small deals. However, medium-sized mergers also realize significant decreases in the 
salaries-to-assets ratio in that period, a fact that justifies the insignificant coefficient of the 
DDD estimator. Finally, the results for ΔLoan do not indicate any significant change in loan 
output after the DFA in any size category. Hence, the DDD estimator in this case suggests 
that the per-employee loan output does not increase or decrease in small deals after the DFA, 
relative to their larger counterparts. Although this finding might raise concerns regarding the 
drivers behind the improved profitability in deals below the $10 mark, it is likely that the 
higher profits depend on factors unrelated to traditional lending activity. For example, the 
special treatment for small banks under the DFA (described in Section 2) may have boosted 
revenues from other sources, such as debit and/or credit cards. 
Insert Table 8 here 
The results of this analysis are important in two ways. First, we document that after the 
DFA, the average small merging bank outperforms the average small non-merging bank, in 
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terms of profitability and cost of labour. Second, we find that the post-DFA improvements in 
profitability and per-employee cost of labour in small deals are significantly higher relative to 
larger deals. These findings suggest that small bank M&As after the DFA do not only create 
shareholder value, but they also result in significant improvements in performance. However, 
one possible limitation of this analysis is that it does not control for observable differences in 
characteristics between comparison groups and time periods. For this reason, we extend this 
analysis using a regression-based approach. 
6.2. Difference-in-difference-in-differences regressions 
In line with Morse (2011) and Tsoutsoura (2015), we also use DDD regression models to 
gauge the magnitude of the DFA on merger-related changes in performance. In these models, 
we incorporate control variables to account for heterogeneity across firm- and deal-specific 
characteristics. Hence, we estimate the following specification: 
, 1, 1 1 2 3 4 , 1 5 , ,i t t i t i t i tDFA Small DFA Small Xa Zy                 (7) 
where Δyi,t+1,t−1 is the difference of the performance variable y (pre-tax ROA, pre-tax ROE, 
Pay, Sal, Loan) defined as the post-merger industry-adjusted performance minus the pre-
merger industry-adjusted performance, Xi,t−1 and Zi,t represent bank- and deal-specific 
variables, respectively (defined in the Appendix). In this specification, the key coefficient of 
interest, β3, measures the impact of the DFA on the industry-adjusted performance of small 
bank mergers. 
Panel A of Table 9 reports the results of the DDD analysis.
16
 Markedly, our findings not 
only complement those presented in Table 8 but also increase their magnitude. In both 
columns (1) and (2), the DDD estimator is strongly significant with a coefficient of 0.005 and 
0.081, respectively. The magnitude of its coefficients suggests that the merger impact on pre-
                                                          
16
 The number of observations in each model is decreased due to the inclusion of Bid Premium in the DDD 
regressions (539 instead of 584, and 353 instead of 378). We obtain similar results even if we do not include this 
control variable in our model specifications. 
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tax ROA (pre-tax ROE) in small mergers is 0.5% (8.1%) higher after the DFA, compared to 
larger deals. Similarly, decreases in the cost of labour (as measured by ΔPay), are 
significantly higher for small bank M&As after the DFA. Finally, in line with what reported 
in Table 8, the DDD estimator is columns (4) and (5) are insignificant. 
One possible concern with the DDD analysis arises if the assignment to the treatment is 
not random, meaning that the observed change in the outcome of interest is a function of 
difference in characteristics, rather than a treatment effect (Tsoutsoura, 2015). Hence, to 
control more directly for the observable differences between deals announced before and 
after the DFA, we again utilize the PSM approach (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). Panel B of 
Table 9 compares changes in performance between post-DFA deals and their pre-DFA 
matched counterparts. Consistent with our previous results, we find that small deals after the 
DFA outperform very similar deals from the pre-DFA period, in terms of profitability and 
cost of labour. Then, we estimate equation (7) using propensity-matched deals, instead of the 
pre-DFA sub-sample.
17
 Panel C reports the results of this analysis. Notably, the matching 
approach strengthens the magnitude of the DDD estimators reported in Panel A. 
Insert Table 9 here 
6.3. Compliance costs and profitability 
Knapp et al. (2005) examine the relationship between changes in post-merger profitability 
and changes in post-merger performance ratios. Following their approach, we investigate 
whether the profitability improvements in small mergers after the DFA are to any extent 
explained by the changes in our compliance costs indicators. To do so, we estimate the 
following model: 
                                                          
17
 Contrary to DDD regressions, matched-DDD regressions have equal number of observations in each 
specification. This happens because we have data for all variables for 81 post-DFA deals. By using Bid 
Premium as control in the probit model we have 76 observations. Then, we match with replacement and we 
obtain 59 pre-DFA matches. Our results do not differ if we match without replacement or if we exclude Bid 
Premium from the probit model 
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  (8) 
where ΔProfitabilityi,t+1,t−1 is the difference in the profitability indicators (pre-tax ROA, pre-
tax ROE) defined as the post-merger industry-adjusted profitability minus the pre-merger 
industry-adjusted profitability, and ΔCompli,t+1,t−1 is the difference in the compliance cost 
indicators (Pay, Sal, Loan) defined as the post-merger industry-adjusted compliance costs 
minus the pre-merger industry-adjusted compliance costs. The coefficient of interest, β7, 
measures the extent to which changes in compliance costs impact profitability in small bank 
M&As after the DFA. 
Table 10 presents the results of this analysis. The first three columns report regressions 
where the dependent variable is the change in pre-tax ROA, and the last three columns report 
regressions where the dependent variable is the change in pre-tax ROE. In line with what we 
reported so far, the interaction variable between DFA and Small is positive and statistically 
significant in all cases, suggesting that profitability in small bank M&As is significantly 
improved after the DFA. In examining the causes behind this improvement, we observe that 
the coefficient of interest is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level in both 
columns (1) and (4). This finding indicates that in small bank mergers, the documented 
decreases in the per-employee cost of labour are associated with higher profitability after the 
DFA. Therefore, we argue that changes in this compliance cost indicator can explain a 
significant part of the improved financial performance of small deals post-DFA. 
Insert Table 10 here 
In sum, only ΔPay is a significant determinant of profitability improvements in small deals 
post-DFA. For this reason, we recognize that our findings on the effect of compliance costs 
savings on post-merger profitability should be interpreted with caution.  
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6.4. Profitability and abnormal returns in small M&As 
Although we find a compelling improvement in profitability of small bank M&As after the 
DFA, it is questionable whether this improvement is to any extent related to announcement 
period abnormal returns. In an efficient market, investor expectations about merger-related 
improvements in financial performance should be impounded in the announcement period 
abnormal returns (Fama, 1998). In this regard, the higher abnormal returns in small deals may 
be a simple projection of the future profitability improvements. To test this prediction, we 
could estimate the following cross-sectional regression as in DeLong and DeYoung (2007): 
2 , 1 3 , ,, 1 , 1, 1i t i t i t i t it tCAR a Profi Xtability Z            (9) 
However, endogeneity concerns may arise if we simply regress abnormal returns on 
changes in profitability. In fact, ΔProfitabilityi,t+1,t−1 may be endogenously determined in 
equation (9), since profitability in small bank mergers has significantly increased due to the 
DFA’s passage, and this increase may translate to higher abnormal returns. Therefore, to 
isolate the exogenous component of profitability, we instrument ΔPre-tax ROA and/or ΔPre-
tax ROE with the post-DFA indicator, and we employ a two-stage least squares regression in 
the spirit of Dahya et al. (2019). The documented increase in profitability after the DFA 
suggests that the DFA indicator satisfies the relevance condition of a valid instrument. In 
addition, we argue that the DFA impacts abnormal returns through its effect on profitability 
changes, fact that satisfies the exclusion criterion. The idea is that the DFA provides 
opportunities for profitability improvements in small deals, and as a result, market 
participants react more favorably to the merger announcement. For the remainder of this 
section, our discussion focuses on small bank M&As, since the DFA effect on returns and 
financial performance is evident only in this sub-sample.
18
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 We repeat the analysis for the sub-samples of medium-sized and large mergers as well as for the larger sub-
sample (both medium-sized and large deals). We do not find any evidence of a significant relation between 
abnormal returns and profitability changes. 
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Table 11 reports the results of the two-stage OLS regressions for the sub-sample of small 
bank M&As. The dependent variable on the first-stage regressions is either the ΔPre-tax ROA 
or ΔPre-tax ROE. In the second-stage regressions, the dependent variable is either the bidder 
or combined CARs, and the changes in profitability are based on their expected values of 
stage one. The positive and highly statistically significant coefficient of the DFA in the first-
stage regressions suggests that the DFA dummy is indeed a valid instrument for the changes 
in profitability. The results of the second-stage regressions indicate a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between abnormal returns and changes in profitability. Collectively, 
our results support the view that the merger-related improvements in profitability can explain 
the higher abnormal returns of small deals after the DFA. 
To ensure the robustness of our results, we also perform weak instrument tests using first-
stage F-statistics. To reject the weak instrument assumption, the first-stage F-statistics should 
be greater than a critical value, which in our case equals 8.96 (Stock and Yogo, 2005). 
Therefore, we report two different first-stage F-statistics: (1) the Craig-Donald F-statistic, and 
(2) the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic, which is more appropriate with the use of 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. We find that both F-statistics are higher that the 
critical value, fact which suggests that the DFA is a relevant instrument.  
Insert Table 11 here 
7. Further robustness checks 
We conduct two main robustness tests to evaluate the consistency of our results. First, we 
examine whether the documented announcement period returns fully reflect the market’s 
perception towards a proposed merger by examining long-run stock returns. More precisely, 
as the literature suggests, we test if there are any significantly negative long-run abnormal 
stock returns after the merger. In this case, it is likely that the positive DFA effect on small 
bank M&As is reversed over time and disappears.  Second, we collect a comparable sample 
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of non-U.S. bank M&As, and we examine the stock market reaction around the 
announcement of these deals. Given that the new legislation impacts only U.S. banks, we 
expect that the DFA effect will be evident only in the U.S. sample. Otherwise, it is also likely 
that the change in market reaction for small bank mergers relates to other factors rather than 
the Dodd-Frank Act itself.  
7.1. Does the DFA effect reverse in the long-run? 
In the previous section of this study, we assume that the market is efficient in incorporating 
the publicly available information in the merging firms’ stock prices. More precisely, we 
propose that the announcement period abnormal returns should provide an unbiased estimate 
of the merger-related synergies on the acquiring firms’ stockholders wealth (Moeller et al., 
2004). If this is not the case, it is likely that the market will correct its short-term misreaction 
in a longer horizon (Masulis et al., 2007). In our case, if profitability improvements of small 
deals are lower than expected, then, the significantly higher announcement period abnormal 
returns for these deals may be reversed by a negative reaction after the merger (Rau and 
Vermaelen, 1998). To examine this possibility, we estimate long-run abnormal stock returns 
for the bidding banks of our post-DFA sub-sample, using the approach outlined by 
Bessembinder and Zhang (2013). 
In order to estimate the long-run abnormal stock returns, we need to identify a matching 
firm for each bidding firm of our post-DFA sub-sample. In the spirit of Loughran and Ritter 
(1995) and Barber and Lyon (1997), each matching firm is defined as the bank with the 
closest book-to-market (BTM) ratio among firms with market capitalization between 70% 
and 130% of the bidding bank. BTM is measured as the ratio of the book value of common 
equity to the market value of common equity at year-end prior to the merger completion date, 
while market capitalization is the market value of common equity at the latest December 
prior to the deal completion date. Then, according to Bessembinder and Zhang (2013), we 
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compute firm-characteristic differences between bidders and their matches for several factors 
that are likely to affect stock returns: size, book-to-market, beta, illiquidity, return 
momentum, and idiosyncratic volatility. Lastly, we regress monthly log-return differences 
between bidders and their matches on these differences in firm characteristics for 24 calendar 
months after the month the deal is completed. Hence, we assess bidder abnormal stock 
returns based on the estimated intercept of the following model:
19
 
2 3
4
,
5 6
, 1ln(1 ) ln(1 ) t tb t m t t
t t t t
Size BTM Beta
Illiq Mom IVOL
R R a  
   
     
 
 
   


 
  (10) 
where Rb,t is the monthly return of the bidder firm b on month t, Rm,t is the monthly return of 
the matching firm m on month t, Δ denotes the normalized difference between bidders and 
their matches for each month t, Size is the market value of equity at the end of the latest June, 
BTM for July of year t to June of year t+1 is the ratio of the book value of common equity at 
the end of the fiscal year t−1, to the market value of common equity at the end of year t−1, 
Beta for July of year t to June of year t+1 is estimated using the market model on monthly 
stock returns over the years t−5 to t−1, Illiq for July of year t to June of year t+1 is defined as 
the market-adjusted average ratio of daily absolute stock returns to dollar trading volume for 
July of year t−1 to June of year t,20 Mom represents the return momentum which is estimated 
as the cumulative return over months −12 to −2, and IVOL is the idiosyncratic volatility 
which is measured as the annualized standard deviation of the residuals estimated from a 
Fama and French (1993) three factor regression model, using daily returns over month −2. In 
each calendar month, we normalize the initial characteristic differences in the scale of −1 to 
+1, with 0 corresponding to the difference with the closest value to 0. 
                                                          
19
  We also convert the estimated intercept on a wealth relative (WR) between bidding and matching firms based 
on the equation 𝑊𝑅 = exp(?̂?𝑇), where ?̂? is the estimated intercept and T is the number of months after the 
month the merger is completed.  
20
 As in Amihud (2002), each firm’s illiquidity on a period t is divided by the market illiquidity over the same 
period.  Market illiquidity is the average illiquidity of all stocks that have return data for more than 200 days 
(from July of year t−1 to June of year t). We eliminate illiquidity outliers at the highest and lowest 1%. 
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Table 12 reports results of the estimated equation (10) for the bidding firms of our post-
DFA sub-sample.
21
 To be consistent with our short-term analysis, we run regressions of 
bidder long-run returns for bidders of small, medium-sized, and large mergers, respectively.
22
 
Column (1) presents results for small mergers, without controlling for any differences 
between bidding and matching firms. The estimated intercept is insignificant, suggesting that 
there are no long-run abnormal returns to bidding firms in small M&As. In columns (2) and 
(3), we allow for differences in firm characteristics and their squared terms, respectively. In 
both cases, the estimated intercept remains insignificant. For medium-sized mergers, the 
significantly negative coefficient of the estimated intercept in column (4) suggests that 
bidders’ accumulated returns are on average 11% smaller compared to their size- and BTM-
matched firms (wealth relative of 0.89). However, when we add the first and second order 
terms in the equations, the estimated intercept becomes insignificant. For large deals, we 
observe a positive and statistically significant intercept when we control for all six 
differences in firm characteristics. Nevertheless, when we account for the non-linear relation 
between firm characteristics and abnormal returns, the coefficient of the estimated intercept 
loses any significance.
23
  
Insert Table 12 here 
Overall, the analysis of the bidder long-run stock performance yields interesting 
conclusions. First, our results contrast the well-stylized fact that bidding firms realize 
statistically negative long-run abnormal returns after the merger (Loughran and Vijh, 1997; 
                                                          
21
 Following Bessembinder and Zhang (2013), along with the pooled OLS regressions, we also implement the 
Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure to ensure the robustness of our results. However, to improve the accuracy 
of such estimates, they require at least 20 firm observations per calendar month. In our sample, this requirement 
could be applicable only to the small mergers sub-sample. For this reason, we estimate the Fama and MacBeth 
regression only for small mergers. The results remained unchanged. 
22
 From the original sample of 55 small mergers, we exclude the acquisition of State Investors Bancorp, Inc. 
from First NBC Bank Holding Company, due to the fact that the latter firm went bankrupt a few months after 
the acquisition, realizing extraordinary monthly returns in the order of −98.43%. 
23
 At this point it should be noted that the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) are equivalent with the 
estimated intercepts of models 1, 4, and 7. BHARs for the small, medium-sized, and large mergers are −2.67%, 
−13.63%, and 4.93%, respectively, and they are only significant for the medium-sized deals. 
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Betton et al., 2008). In fact, our findings are in line with Bessembinder and Zhang (2013), 
since when we account for differences in firm characteristics and their squared terms, any 
significance in long-run abnormal returns disappears. Second, our results are consistent with 
the market efficiency hypothesis, because any long-term return anomalies are fully explained 
by differences in characteristics between bidder and matching firms. Therefore, we propose 
that announcement period abnormal returns should provide an accurate market estimate of the 
merger-related wealth effects. Therefore, the positive DFA effect on small bank mergers is 
relatively robust overtime, since it is not followed by a significantly negative market reaction 
in the longer run. 
7.2. Is there a DFA effect on non-U.S. bank M&As? 
Up to this point, our empirical evidence suggests that the DFA has altered the way the market 
participants respond to the announcement of small bank mergers. However, it is likely that 
the observed pattern in abnormal returns relates to other confounding factors, such as the 
international economic conditions or the implementation of Basel III. To address this 
concern, we collect a sample of non-U.S. bank M&As, and we examine whether the DFA 
effect is evident outside the United States (where the DFA is not effective). 
We retrieve merger data for non-U.S deals from the Thomson ONE database. By applying 
the same criteria with the U.S. dataset, we obtain a final sample of 195 completed bank 
mergers between non-U.S. banks.
24
 Equity return data are collected from Datastream and 
accounting data from Worldscope. Further, we also examine a sub-sample of 94 European 
bank mergers, since financial markets in Europe are more integrated compared to other non-
U.S. countries. In the sub-sample of European bank mergers, we restrict that both bidders and 
targets are located in the European Union (EU-15), Norway and Switzerland (Vallascas and 
Hagendorff, 2011). 
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 We eliminate one merger due to the fact that the bidder experienced extraordinary returns at the 
announcement date. In fact, Vestjysk Bank A/S realized announcement abnormal returns of 55.47%. 
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We estimate bidder, target, and combined cumulative abnormal returns over a three-day 
window centered on the announcement date for all 195 non-U.S. bank mergers.
25
 As in 
DeLong (2003), bidders realize insignificant returns, while target abnormal returns are 
positive and statistically significant. Overall, the sampled deals do not create value for the 
combined entities. This pattern in abnormal returns persists also in the European sub-sample, 
since bidder and combined CARs are insignificant, and target CARs are positive and 
significant (Campa and Hernando, 2006; Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou, 2013; Beltratti 
and Paladino, 2013).  
To evaluate whether abnormal returns in small non-U.S. and/or European mergers are 
significantly higher after the DFA, we estimate the difference-in-differences model of 
equation (6). For each dependent variable, we run two separate regressions, one for the whole 
sample of 195 non-U.S. deals, and one for the sub-sample of 94 European deals. Notably, as 
we observe in Table 13, the DD estimator is not significant in any regression model.
26
 Hence, 
we conclude that the DFA effect on announcement period returns is only evident in the U.S. 
market, a finding which strengthens the interpretation of our results for the U.S. banking 
industry. 
Insert Table 13 here 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper, we initially examine whether the Dodd-Frank Act has a significant impact in 
the merger activity of U.S. banks. Increased compliance costs, stringent capital and prudential 
standards and fear of lost opportunities are likely drivers of bank consolidation. In fact, we 
                                                          
25
 Abnormal returns are estimated using the market model. The estimation period consists of 180 trading days 
and ends 21 trading days before the event date. For the non-U.S. sample, we use the MSCI World index as the 
benchmark index. For the European sample, we use the STOXX Europe 600 banks as the benchmark index. The 
results are robust to the use of several other event windows. 
26
 It is possible that the insignificant results are driven by a power issue, due to the substantially smaller sample 
size, compared to the U.S. sample. For this reason, we replicate the DD analysis of Table 4 using a random sub-
sample of 195 deals, drawn from the initial sample of 640 M&As. Again, the DD estimator is positive and 
significant in both regressions of bidder and combined CARs. 
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observe a surge in small bank M&As after the Act’s enactment. Small banks became 
significantly more acquisitive after the DFA, since getting larger helps these institutions to 
cover the costs of complying with the new regulations. In contrast, merging activity of 
medium-sized and large banks is considerably lower after the DFA, than before.  
Based on our research question, we investigate whether the DFA has effected changes on 
the way market participants view U.S. bank M&As. By comparing deals before and after the 
Act’s passage, we document a positive DFA effect on announcement returns of small deals. 
At the univariate level, bidder and combined announcement CARs are significantly higher in 
small bank mergers after the DFA’s enactment. At the multivariate level, the results of the 
difference-in-differences regression models also indicate that small bank mergers create more 
shareholder value after the DFA, compared to larger deals.  
To shed more light in the potential sources of this documented improvement in small deals 
abnormal returns, we examine the long-run performance of the merging firms of our sample. 
In support of our arguments, we find that after the DFA, small bank mergers are significantly 
more profitable and achieve higher savings in the cost of labor compared to larger deals. 
More importantly, our evidence suggests that the significant reductions in the per-employee 
cost of labor lead to higher profits, which in turn lead to higher abnormal returns. 
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Appendix: Variable definitions 
Panel A: Deal-Specific Variables 
Variables Definition 
State Dummy variable: 1 if both bidder and target are headquartered in the same 
state, and 0 otherwise. 
Stock Dummy variable: 1 if the deal is financed with stock, and 0 otherwise. 
Combo Dummy variable: 1 if the deal is financed with a combination of cash and 
stock, and 0 otherwise. 
Relative Size The ratio of target to bidder total assets at year-end prior to the merger 
announcement. 
Small Dummy variable: 1 for mergers with combined firms’ assets of less than 
$10 billion, and 0 otherwise. 
Deal Value Transaction value (in billion $). 
Days to Completion The difference between the merger announcement and completion date. 
Bid Premium Offer price per target share divided by the target’s market price per share 5 
days before the announcement date. 
Panel B: Firm-Specific Variables 
Acquirer’s Size The natural logarithm of the bidding firm’s total assets at year-end prior to 
the merger announcement. 
Bidder (or Target) 
ROA 
Bidder (or target) firm’s return on assets (ROA) at year-end prior to the 
merger announcement (Net Income/Total Assets). 
Roadiff  The difference between bidder and target return on assets. 
Bidder (or Target) 
Employees 
Bidder (or target) firm’s number of employees (in thousands) at year-end 
prior to the merger announcement. 
Bidder (or Target) 
equity-to-assets 
Bidder (or target) firm’s ratio of common equity at year-end prior to the 
merger announcement to total assets at year-end prior to the merger 
announcement. 
Panel C: Performance Variables 
Bidder (or Target) pre-
tax ROA 
Bidder (or target) firm’s ratio of net income before taxes to total assets. 
Bidder (or Target) pre-
tax ROE 
Bidder (or target) firm’s ratio of net income before taxes to common 
shareholders’ equity. 
Bidder (or Target) Pay The ratio of the bidder (or target) firm’s salaries to number of employees. 
Bidder (or Target) Sal The ratio of the bidder (or target) firm’s total salaries to total assets. 
Bidder (or Target) Loan The ratio of the bidder (or target) firm’s loans to number of employees. 
Panel D: Long-Run Abnormal Returns 
Size Market capitalization at the end of the latest June. 
BTM BTM for July of year t to June of year t+1 is the ratio of the book value of 
common equity at the end of the fiscal year t−1 to the market value of 
common equity at the end of year t−1. 
Beta  Beta for July of year t to June of year t+1 is the market beta estimated using 
the market model with monthly stock returns during years t−5 to t−1. 
Illiq Illiq for July of year t to June of year t+1 is the average ratio of daily stock 
returns to dollar trading volume for July of year t−1 to June of year, relative 
to the average market illiquidity over the same period. 
Mom Cumulative stock returns over months −12 to −2. 
IVOL 
 
The annualized standard deviation of the residuals estimated from a Fama 
and French (1993) three factor regression model, using daily returns over 
month −2. 
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Figure 1 
U.S. bank M&As from 1990 to 2014 
The figure illustrates the annual number of deals of completed U.S. bank mergers announced between 1990 and 
2014. The sample consists of mergers between commercial banks and savings institutions with three-digit SIC 
codes of 602 and 603, respectively, or bank holding companies with a four-digit SIC code of 6712, listed on 
NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq exchanges. Small, medium-sized, and large mergers represent mergers with 
combined firms’ assets of less than $10 billion, between $10 billion and $50 billion, and greater than $50 
billion, respectively. Merger data are collected from Thomson ONE database. 
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Table 1  
Distribution of merging firm’s total assets 
The table illustrates the distribution of the merging firms’ total assets for 640 completed bank mergers 
announced between 1990 and 2014. The sample is divided into three separate asset-size categories: Small, 
medium-sized, and large banking organizations are those banks with assets of less than $10 billion, between $10 
billion and $50 billion, and greater than $50 billion, respectively. Panels A and B segment the sample based on 
whether the merger was announced before or after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act (July 21, 2010). For the 
two separate sub-periods, we report summary statistics for the bidder, target and combined firm’s total assets at 
year-end prior to the merger announcement (in billion $).  
Panel A: Pre-DFA   Small Medium Large 
Bidders n=275 n=203 n=79 
Mean 3.440 25.508 178.273 
Median 2.599 23.034 101.820 
Min 0.097 10.094 50.856 
Max 9.856 49.902 1715.746 
Std. Dev. 2.748 11.648 245.433 
Targets n=499 n=38 n=20 
Mean 1.500 22.765 147.033 
Median 0.762 21.397 79.382 
Min 0.500 10.540 51.238 
Max 9.711 46.679 782.896 
Std. Dev. 1.817 10.614 168.518 
Combined n=255 n=205 n=97 
Mean 3.668 25.447 195.046 
Median 2.861 22.666 105.526 
Min 0.157 10.033 50.064 
Max 9.862 49.342 1927.476 
Std. Dev. 2.588 11.705 283.205 
Panel B: Post-DFA Small Medium Large 
Bidders n=61 n=16 n=6 
Mean 4.583 14.407 103.774 
Median 4.087 13.759 73.402 
Min 0.616 10.074 53.667 
Max 9.727 25.037 183.010 
Std. Dev. 2.759 3.998 62.001 
Targets n=79 n=4 n=0 
Mean 1.557 21.705 N/A 
Median 0.941 15.183 N/A 
Min 0.198 11.097 N/A 
Max 9.463 45.356 N/A 
Std. Dev. 1.835 16.110 N/A 
Combined n=55 n=22 n=6 
Mean 4.948 16.071 117.564 
Median 4.401 14.712 101.629 
Min 1.196 10.228 56.917 
Max 9.949 27.890 201.483 
Std. Dev. 2.485 5.179 63.470 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics 
This table summarizes descriptive statistics for a sample of 640 completed bank mergers announced between 
1990 and 2014. We report summary statistics for the whole period as well as for the two separate sub-periods 
(pre-DFA, and post-DFA). Difference represents the differences in mean and median values between the post-
DFA and the pre-DFA periods. All continuous variables are defined in the Appendix. Panel A displays statistics 
for firm-specific variables. Panel B provides statistics for deal-specific variables. Method of payment is 
expressed by the percentages of cash, stock and both cash and stock deals. Geographic diversification is 
measured by % same state deals. Target’s equity percentages sought and acquired represent the proportion of 
target’s equity the bidder sought and managed to acquire, respectively. Median values are in brackets. 
Significance for differences in means (medians) is based on the t-test (Mann-Whitney test). The symbols *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
 Whole Period Pre-DFA Post-DFA Difference 
Panel A: Firm-Specific Variables (1) (2) (3) (3)−(2) 
Bidder Assets (in billion $) 36.497 36.862 13.489 −23.373* 
 [9.220] [10.158] [5.536] [−4.622]*** 
Target Assets (in billion $) 7.442 8.176 2.515 −5.661 
 [0.913] [0.896] [0.985] [0.089] 
Relative Size 0.301 0.294 0.350 0.056 
 [0.147] [0.136] [0.240] [0.104]*** 
Bidder ROA 1.060 1.113 0.701 −0.412*** 
 [1.079] [1.136] [0.817] [−0.319]*** 
Target ROA 0.746 0.817 0.273 −0.544*** 
 [0.888] [0.938] [0.455] [−0.483]*** 
Roadiff 0.314 0.296 0.428 0.132 
 [0.208] [0.202] [0.256] [0.054] 
Bidder equity-to-assets 0.079 0.072 0.126 0.054*** 
 [0.081] [0.079] [0.116] [0.037]*** 
Target equity-to-assets 0.092 0.090 0.107 0.017*** 
 [0.084] [0.083] [0.100] [0.017]*** 
Bidder Employees (in thousands) 10.009 11.254 2.727 −8.527*** 
 [2.975] [4.880] [1.324] [−3.556]*** 
Target Employees (in thousands) 3.020 3.662 0.437 −3.224** 
 [0.292] [0.335] [0.238] [−0.097]*** 
Panel B: Deal-Specific Variables     
Deal Value (in billion $) 1.193 1.324 0.318 −1.006* 
 [0.164] [0.167] [0.132] [−0.035] 
Bid Premium 1.359 1.352 1.400 0.051 
 [1.298] [1.286] [1.342] [0.056] 
Days to Completion 181.938 177.874 209.204 31.330*** 
 [186.50] [167.00] [188.00] [21.00]*** 
% of cash deal 9.68 10.77 2.41  
% of stock deal 55.47 57.27 43.37  
% of both cash and stock deal 34.85 31.96 54.22  
% same state deals 47.66 47.58 48.19  
% Target’s equity sought in transaction 99.72 99.68 100.00  
% Target’s equity acquired after transaction 99.71 99.68 99.93  
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Table 3 
CARs around the announcement date 
This table illustrates the bidder, target and combined firms’ cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for a sample of 
640 completed bank mergers announced between 1990 and 2014. Panels A to D report bidder, target and 
combined CARs for the whole period as well as for the two separate sub-periods (pre-DFA, and post-DFA). 
Difference is the difference in mean CARs between the post-DFA and the pre-DFA periods. Small, medium-
sized, and large mergers represent those mergers with combined firms’ assets of less than $10 billion, between 
$10 billion and $50 billion, and greater than $50 billion, respectively. Abnormal returns are estimated using the 
market model for a three-day event window centered on the announcement date (−1, +1). The estimation period 
consists of 180 trading days and ends 21 trading days before the event date. The parametric test is the 
standardized cross-sectional test (StdCSect), and the non-parametric test is the Corrado’s rank test (Rank Test). 
Significance for the difference between mean CARs is based on the t-test assuming unequal variances. The 
symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-
tail test. 
  Whole Period  Pre-DFA  Post-DFA  Difference 
Panel A: All Mergers  n =640  n=557  n=83   
Bidder CAR  −1.66%  −1.73%  −1.14%  0.59% 
StdCSect  (−10.23)***  (−10.36)***  (−2.01)**  (t=1.11) 
Rank Test  [−7.46]***  [−7.56]***  [−1.62]   
Target CAR  20.00%  18.78%  28.13%  9.35% 
StdCSect  (24.41)***  (21.56)***  (12.78)***  (t=3.39)*** 
Rank Test  [10.81]***  [10.40]***  [6.70]***   
Combined CAR  0.90%  0.69%  2.32%  1.63% 
StdCSect  (4.95)***  (3.40)***  (4.36)***  (t=3.04)*** 
Rank Test  [3.36]***  [1.96]*  [3.92]***   
Panel B: Small Mergers  n=310  n=255  n=55   
Bidder CAR  −1.51%  −1.73%  −0.48%  1.25% 
StdCSect  (−5.58)***  (−6.38)***  (−0.40)  (t=1.77)* 
Rank Test  [−5.28]***  [−5.68]***  [−0.25]   
Target CAR  22.18%  20.56%  29.67%  9.11% 
StdCSect  (15.93)***  (13.13)***  (10.84)***  (t= 2.59)** 
Rank Test  [9.96]****  [9.54]***  [5.52]***   
Combined CAR  1.92%  1.59%  3.44%  1.85% 
StdCSect  (7.56)***  (5.79)***  (5.31)***  (t=2.65)*** 
Rank Test  [6.02]***  [4.57]***  [4.55]***   
Panel C: Medium Mergers  n=227  n=205  n=22   
Bidder CAR  −1.83%  −1.72%  −2.86%  −1.14% 
StdCSect  (−8.02)***  (−7.42)***  (−3.09)**  (t=1.23) 
Rank Test  [−6.16]***  [−5.70]***  [−2.31]**   
Target CAR  18.34%  17.31%  27.91%  10.60% 
StdCSect  (16.67)***  (15.24)***  (7.77)***  (t=2.38)** 
Rank Test  [9.55]***  [9.08]***  [4.36]***   
Combined CAR  −0.27%  −0.26%  0.22%  0.48% 
StdCSect  (−0.44)  (−0.54)  (0.13)  (t=0.58) 
Rank Test  [−0.75]  [−0.91]  [0.41]   
Panel D: Large Mergers  n=103  n=97  n=6   
Bidder CAR  −1.80%  −1.77%  −0.87%  0.90% 
StdCSect  (−4.52)***  (−4.41)***  (−0.45)  (t=0.49) 
Rank Test  [−4.91]***  [−4.64]***  [−0.85]   
Target CAR  17.09%  17.23%  14.78%  −2.45% 
StdCSect  (10.42)***  (10.48)***  (1.58)  (t=0.18) 
Rank Test  [5.90]***  [6.13]***  [0.11]   
Combined CAR  0.31%  0.35%  −0.25%  −0.60% 
StdCSect  (−0.21)  (−0.27)  (0.20)  (t=0.32) 
Rank Test  [−1.67]*  [−1.60]  [−0.52]   
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Table 4 
Single-difference and difference-in-differences regressions  
This table presents the results of the single-differences and the difference-in-differences regression models. 
Models 1, 3, and 5 present the results of the single-difference regressions, and models 2, 4, and 6 present the 
results of the difference-in-differences regressions, for a sample of 640 completed U.S. bank mergers announced 
between 1990 and 2014. In each regression, the dependent variable is the bidder, target, or combined three-day 
CARs, centered on the announcement date. All independent variables are defined in the Appendix. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
  Bidder  Target  Combined 
Variables  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Constant  0.004 0.006  0.350*** 0.350***  0.014 0.016 
  (0.31) (0.55)  (6.07) (6.07)  (1.16) (1.36) 
DFA  −0.003 −0.020  0.103** 0.107*  0.003 −0.012 
  (−0.27) (−1.43)  (2.18) (1.95)  (0.28) (−0.98) 
Small  0.003 −0.001  0.019 0.020  0.008 0.004 
  (0.64) (−0.14)  (0.78) (0.78)  (1.56) (0.78) 
DFA·Small   0.022**   −0.005   0.019** 
   (2.09)   (−0.12)   (2.13) 
State  −0.006 −0.006  0.045*** 0.045***  −0.000 −0.000 
  (−1.49) (−1.49)  (3.12) (3.12)  (−0.13) (−0.12) 
Stock  −0.015*** −0.015***  −0.049 −0.048  −0.015** −0.015** 
  (−2.97) (−3.02)  (−1.56) (−1.56)  (−2.49) (−2.53) 
Combo  −0.018*** −0.018***  −0.017 −0.017  −0.009 −0.010 
  (−3.43) (−3.47)  (−0.54) (−0.53)  (−1.53) (−1.55) 
Relative Size  0.000 −0.001  −0.062** −0.062**  0.031*** 0.031*** 
  (0.02) (−0.06)  (−2.07) (−2.05)  (4.43) (4.34) 
Acquirer’s Size  −0.001 −0.002  −0.002 −0.002  −0.003 −0.003 
  (−0.46) (−0.74)  (−0.24) (−0.22)  (−1.22) (−1.47) 
Roadiff  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
  (1.02) (1.29)  (0.26) (0.24)  (0.99) (1.25) 
Target-equity-to-assets  −0.063 −0.062  −0.912*** −0.912***  −0.007 −0.007 
  (−1.42) (−1.42)  (−4.41) (−4.41)  (−0.15) (−0.14) 
Days to Completion  0.000 0.000  −0.000** −0.000**  −0.000 −0.000 
  (0.37) (0.50)  (−2.16) (−2.15)  (−0.24) (−0.10) 
N  640 640  640 640  640 640 
Adjusted R
2
  0.009 0.014  0.084 0.083  0.139 0.143 
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Table 5 
Difference-in-differences estimators for hypothetical treatment periods 
This table reports the difference-in-differences estimators of the DD regressions presented in Table 4. All 
regressions refer to the pre-DFA period. Year denotes the starting year of each hypothetical treatment period. 
For example, 2006 denotes the period starting from 2006 until the DFA’s enactment. Pre and post represent the 
number of observation in each pre-treatment and post-treatment period, respectively. In all DD models the total 
number of observations equals 557. The dependent variable in each regression is the bidder, target, or combined 
three-day CARs centered on the announcement date. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. 
Year Bidder  Target  Combined Pre Post 
2006  −0.011  0.018  −0.009 482 75 
 (−0.92)  (0.34)  (−0.85)   
2005 −0.010  0.031  −0.006 459 98 
 (−1.02)  (0.67)  (−0.66)   
2004 −0.007  0.011  −0.010 415 142 
 (−0.87)  (0.30)  (−1.24)   
2003  −0.002  −0.008  −0.004 377 180 
 (−0.33)  (−0.25)  (−0.56)   
2002 −0.004  −0.015  −0.003 359 198 
 (−0.52)  (−0.46)  (−0.50)   
2001 −0.001  −0.019  0.006 320 237 
 (−0.16)  (−0.61)  (0.89)   
2000 −0.001  0.012  0.011 287 270 
 (−0.13)  (0.43)  (1.58)   
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Table 6 
CARs based on propensity score matching 
This table illustrates CARs based on propensity scores estimated (PSM) from a probit model. In each model, the 
dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal is announced after the DFA, and 0 otherwise. 
Panel A reports the results of the probit model for the whole sample of 640 mergers, and for three separate sub-
samples of mergers (small, medium-sized, and large). Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. Panel B reports the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for each sample. We report PSM 
results using the closest-neighbor approach. Standard errors for the ATTs are the heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors outlined in Abadie and Imbens (2006). The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
Panel A: Probit estimation results All Small Medium Large 
Post-DFA=1 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant −4.008*** −4.584*** 0.253 −8.730 
 (−6.98) (−4.96) (0.20) (−0.02) 
Small 0.759***    
 (3.27)    
State −0.246* −0.311 −0.570* 0.533 
 (−1.66) (−1.60) (−1.88) (0.96) 
Stock 0.697** 1.051 0.086 4.956 
 (1.96) (1.58) (0.14) (0.01) 
Combo 1.067*** 1.487** 0.294 5.423 
 (3.02) (2.24) (0.47) (0.01) 
Relative Size 0.202 1.265*** −0.086 −1.176 
 (0.98) (3.81) (−0.18) (−1.00) 
Acquirer’s Size 0.116 0.739*** −1.375*** −0.119 
 (1.51) (4.90) (−3.69) (−0.27) 
Target-equity-to-assets 6.084*** 8.764*** 10.858*** 8.764 
 (3.41) (3.42) (2.68) (1.28) 
Days to Completion 0.005*** 0.003* 0.007*** 0.009** 
 (4.01) (1.83) (2.69) (2.29) 
N 640 310 227 103 
Pseudo R
2
 0.120 0.183 0.267 0.316 
Panel B: ATTs All Small Medium Large 
Bidder     
Post-DFA −1.14% −0.48% −2.86% −0.87% 
Pre-DFA matches −1.94% −3.70% −3.08% −3.76% 
Difference 0.80% 3.22%*** 0.22% 2.89% 
Target     
Post-DFA 28.13% 29.67% 27.91% 14.78% 
Pre-DFA matches 17.17% 14.15% 9.84% 31.67% 
Difference 10.96%*** 15.52%*** 18.07%*** −16.89% 
Combined     
Post-DFA 2.32% 3.44% 0.22% −0.25% 
Pre-DFA matches 1.12% −0.29% −0.47% −0.58% 
Difference 1.20% 3.75%*** 0.69% 0.33% 
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Table 7  
Single-difference and difference-in-differences regressions for propensity-matched deals 
This table summarizes the single-differences and the difference-in-differences regression results using 
propensity-matched observations. Models 1, 3, and 5 present the results of the single-difference regressions, and 
models 2, 4, and 6 present the results of the difference-in-differences regressions. Observations of our treatment 
and control groups for the post-DFA period are matched with their pre-DFA counterparts. In each regression, 
the dependent variable is the bidder, target, or combined three-day CARs, centered on the announcement date. 
Control variables are the same with Table 4. All independent variables are defined in the Appendix. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. The symbols **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, 
using a 2-tail test. 
  Bidder  Target  Combined 
Variables  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Constant  0.007 0.014  0.313** 0.324**  0.012 0.019 
  (0.29) (0.60)  (2.50) (2.61)  (0.58) (0.85) 
DFA  0.013* −0.010  0.099*** 0.064  0.018** −0.004 
  (1.77) (−1.07)  (3.11) (1.20)  (2.58) (−0.42) 
Small  0.006 −0.012  −0.015 −0.044  0.001 −0.016 
  (0.65) (−1.05)  (−0.32) (−0.75)  (0.14) (−1.27) 
DFA·Small   0.034**   0.052   0.032** 
   (2.54)   (0.82)   (2.56) 
Control Variables  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N  151 151  151 151  151 151 
Adjusted R
2
  0.000 0.016  0.139 0.136  0.150 0.173 
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Table 8 
Changes in merger performance around M&As 
This table summarizes merger-related differences in financial performance and compliance costs for a sample of completed bank mergers announced between 1990 and 2014. 
Panel A reports changes in the financial performance of the merging banks and Panel B reports changes in several compliance costs indicators. Δ denotes the difference 
between the post-merger industry-adjusted performance of the actual combined bank and the pre-merger industry-adjusted performance of a hypothetical combination of the 
bidder and target banks. Pre-merger refers to the year-end prior to the merger announcement. Post-merger refers to two years after the pre-merger year. Column (5) is the 
difference between column (2) and columns (3+4), and represents a difference-in-differences (DD) estimate. Column (6) represents the difference-in-difference-in-differences 
(DDD) estimate and is the difference between the DD estimate of the post-DFA period and the DD estimate of the pre-DFA period (as presented in column 5). All variables 
are defined in the Appendix. Significance for the differences is based on the t-test assuming unequal variances. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
Panel A: Changes in financial performance  All  Small  Medium  Large  DD  DDD 
ΔPre-tax ROA  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Pre-DFA  −0.0009**  −0.0013***  0.0001  −0.0014  −0.0009  0.0037*** 
Post-DFA  −0.0006  0.0003  −0.0030***  −0.0005  0.0028**   
(Post-DFA)−(Pre-DFA)  0.0003  0.0016*  −0.0031***  0.0009     
ΔPre-tax ROE             
Pre-DFA  −0.0348***  −0.0374***  −0.0330***  −0.0317**  −0.0049  0.0705*** 
Post-DFA  0.0151  0.0378***  −0.0335***  −0.0070  0.0656***   
(Post-DFA)−(Pre-DFA)  0.0499***  0.0752***  −0.0005  0.0247     
Panel B: Changes in compliance costs  All  Small  Medium  Large  DD   DDD 
ΔPay  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Pre-DFA  −0.0052  0.0041***  −0.0083  −0.0157*  0.0161***  −0.0149** 
Post-DFA  −0.0033***  −0.0029***  −0.0055***  0.0009  0.0012   
(Post-DFA)−(Pre-DFA)  0.0019  −0.0070***  0.0028  0.0166*     
ΔSal             
Pre-DFA  0.0000  0.0002  −0.0002  −0.0002  0.0004  0.0001 
Post-DFA  −0.0009***  −0.0007**  −0.0017***  0.0007  0.0005   
(Post-DFA)−(Pre-DFA)  −0.0009**  −0.0009*  −0.0015**  0.0005     
ΔLoan             
Pre-DFA  −0.2697  0.1827  −0.1376  −1.0650*  0.7786**  −0.7373 
Post-DFA  −0.0912  −0.0770  0.1313  −1.0336  −0.0413   
(Post-DFA)−(Pre-DFA)  0.1785  −0.2597  0.2689  −0.0314     
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Table 9 
Difference-in-difference-in-differences regressions and propensity score matching 
This table reports results of the difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) regressions and the propensity 
score matching (PSM) analysis. Panel A reports the DDD estimators. In each column, the dependent variable is 
different (ΔPre-tax ROA, ΔPre-tax ROE, ΔPay, ΔSal, ΔLoan). Δ denotes the difference between the post-merger 
industry-adjusted performance of the actual combined bank and the pre-merger industry-adjusted performance 
of a hypothetical combination of the bidder and target banks. Pre-merger refers to the year-end prior to the 
merger announcement. Post-merger refers to two years after the pre-merger year. Control variables are the same 
with Table 6 with the addition of Bid Premium. All variables are defined in the Appendix. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Panel B reports the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for each sample. We report PSM results using 
the closest-neighbor approach. Standard errors for the ATTs are the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors 
outlined in Abadie and Imbens (2006).  Panel C repeats the DDD analysis of Panel A, using PSM-matched deals 
as the pre-DFA sample. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 
levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
   Profitability  Compliance Costs  
Panel A: DDD    ΔPre-tax ROA ΔPre-tax ROE  ΔPay ΔSal ΔLoan 
Variables   (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Constant   0.004 0.054  −0.036 0.001 1.238 
   (1.27) (1.07)  (−1.08) (0.73) (0.74) 
DFA   −0.002 0.005  0.010 −0.001** 0.512 
   (−1.64) (0.35)  (1.43) (−2.06) (1.46) 
Small   −0.002** −0.025  0.024** 0.000 −0.527 
   (−2.01) ( ̶ 1.47)  (2.34) (0.96) (−0.90) 
DFA·Small   0.005*** 0.081***  −0.017** 0.001 −0.247 
   (3.59) (3.62)  ( ̶ 2.17) (1.28) (−0.63) 
Control Variables   Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
N   539 539  353 539 353 
Adjusted R
2
   0.051 0.042  0.024 0.045 0.045 
Panel B: ATTs   ΔPre-tax ROA ΔPre-tax ROE  ΔPay ΔSal ΔLoan 
Small mergers         
Post-DFA   0.0003 0.0378  −0.0029 −0.0007 −0.0770 
Pre-DFA matches   −0.0024 −0.0800  0.0037 0.0013 0.0788 
Difference   0.0027** 0.1178***  −0.0066** −0.0020** −0.1558 
Medium-sized mergers         
Post-DFA   −0.0030 −0.0335  −0.0055 −0.0017 0.1313 
Pre-DFA matches   −0.0027 −0.0762  −0.0028 0.0002 0.0590 
Difference   −0.0003 0.0427  −0.0027 −0.0019*** 0.0723 
Large mergers         
Post-DFA   −0.0005 −0.0070  0.0009 0.0007 −1.0336 
Pre-DFA matches   −0.0182 −0.2607  −0.0108 0.0007 −0.6527 
Difference   0.0177 0.2537  0.0117 0.0000 −0.3809 
Panel C: Matched-DDD    ΔPre-tax ROA ΔPre-tax ROE  ΔPay ΔSal ΔLoan 
Variables   (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Constant   0.005 −0.041  0.066* 0.000 0.002 
   (1.22) (−0.48)  (1.76) (0.34) (1.52) 
DFA   −0.004*** −0.027  0.027 −0.001* 0.001 
   (−2.67) (−1.39)  (1.61) (−1.66) (1.41) 
Small   −0.005** −0.074**  0.020 −0.001 −0.000 
   (−2.29) (−2.12)  (1.52) (−1.02) (−0.23) 
DFA·Small   0.009*** 0.152***  −0.027* 0.001 −0.001 
   (4.29) (4.47)  (−1.89) (1.31) (−0.78) 
Control Variables   Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
N   135 135  135 135 135 
Adjusted R
2
   0.129 0.207  0.382 0.009  0.313 
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Table 10 
Cross-sectional regressions of changes in profitability  
This table summarizes regression results for changes in post-merger financial performance for a sample of 
completed bank mergers announced between 1990 and 2014. The dependent variable in the first (last) three 
columns is the pre-tax ROA (pre-tax ROE). Δ denotes the difference between the post-merger industry-adjusted 
performance of the actual combined bank and the pre-merger industry-adjusted performance of a hypothetical 
combination of the bidder and target banks. Pre-merger refers to the year-end prior to the merger announcement. 
Post-merger refers to two years after the pre-merger year. The definition of ΔCompl changes across columns 
(ΔPay, ΔSal, or ΔLoan). Control variables are the same with Table 9. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
  ΔPre-tax ROA  ΔPre-tax ROE 
  ΔPay ΔSal ΔLoan  ΔPay ΔSal ΔLoan 
Variables  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Constant  0.003 0.002 0.004  0.008 0.030 0.024 
  (0.73) (0.69) (0.87)  (0.11) (0.62) (0.32) 
DFA  −0.000 −0.001 −0.002  0.032* 0.005 0.017 
  (−0.13) (−1.01) (−1.16)  (1.89) (0.27) (0.93) 
Small  −0.001 −0.002* −0.001  −0.014 −0.026 −0.014 
  (−0.74) (−1.86) (−0.82)  (−0.53) (−1.38) (−0.54) 
ΔCompl  0.004 0.818*** −0.000  −0.037 3.723 −0.001 
  (0.71) (2.61) (−0.42)  (−0.41) (0.69) (−0.35) 
DFA·Small  0.004** 0.005*** 0.005***  0.072** 0.081*** 0.089*** 
  (2.31) (3.03) (3.14)  (2.48) (3.30) (3.19) 
DFA·ΔCompl  0.334*** −0.263 −0.001**  3.918*** −2.234 −0.006 
  (3.62) (−0.51) (−2.19)  (4.99) (−0.33) (−0.68) 
Small·ΔCompl  −0.027** −0.581* −0.000**  0.152 −0.551 0.001 
  (−2.49) (−1.77) (−2.33)  (1.09) (−0.10) (0.35) 
DFA·Small·ΔCompl  −0.289** 0.363 0.002  −3.533** −6.944 0.044 
  (−2.36) (0.57) (0.99)  (−1.99) (−0.78) (1.41) 
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
N  353 539 353  353 539 353 
Adjusted R
2
  0.098 0.121 0.092  0.052 0.054 0.050 
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Table 11 
Financial performance and abnormal returns in small bank M&As 
This table reports results from two-stage instrumental variable regressions for a sample of small bank M&As 
announced from 1990 to 2014. In the first stage regressions, the dependent variable is either the Δpre-tax ROA 
(model 1) or the Δpre-tax ROE (model 4). The DFA indicator is used as the instrument for the first-stage 
regressions. In the second-stage regressions, the dependent variable is either the bidder CARs (models 2 and 5) 
or the combined CARs (models 3 and 6). Δpre-tax ROA and Δpre-tax ROE refer to the predicted values from the 
first-stage regressions. Δ denotes the difference between the post-merger industry-adjusted performance of the 
actual combined bank and the pre-merger industry-adjusted performance of a hypothetical combination of the 
bidder and target banks. Pre-merger refers to the year-end prior to the merger announcement. Post-merger refers 
to two years after the pre-merger year. Control variables are the same with Table 9. All variables are defined in 
the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. The symbols **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.05 and 
0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
 1
st
 stage 2
nd
 stage 2
nd
 stage 1
st
 stage 2
nd
 stage 2
nd
 stage 
Variables 
ΔPre-tax 
ROA 
(1) 
Bidder 
CAR 
(2) 
Combined 
CAR 
(3) 
ΔPre-tax 
ROE 
(4) 
Bidder 
CAR 
(5) 
Combined 
CAR 
(6) 
Constant 0.004 0.043 −0.027 0.083 0.049** −0.021 
 (1.24) (1.64) (−0.98) (1.44) (2.49) (−0.87) 
DFA 0.003***   0.101***   
 (3.55)   (5.06)   
ΔPre-tax ROA  6.307** 5.698**    
  (2.09) (2.00)    
ΔPre-tax ROE     0.202** 0.183** 
     (2.27) (2.11) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Craig-Donald F-statistic 9.59   26.71   
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 13.97   25.46   
N 264 264 264 264 264 264 
Adjusted R
2
 0.079 0.119 0.116 0.097 0.119 0.116 
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Table 12 
Long-term abnormal stock returns of bidders in bank M&As 
This table summarizes the OLS regression results for the monthly differences in log returns between bidders and their size- and book-to-market matched firms, for 24 months 
after the merger completion. All independent variables are normalized on a −1 to +1 range and are defined in the Appendix. Robust t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
  Small   Medium   Large 
Variables  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Constant  −0.0010 0.0004 −0.0102  −0.0049** −0.0031 −0.0041  0.0017 0.0142** 0.0042 
  (−0.53) (0.21) (−1.47)  (−2.65) (−1.18) (−1.15)  (1.24) (4.44) (1.42) 
ΔSize   −0.0029 −0.0022   −0.0022 −0.0039   −0.0018 0.0242 
   (−0.89) (−0.68)   (−0.64) (−1.37)   (−0.10) (1.33) 
ΔSize2    0.0023    −0.0015    −0.0060 
    (0.46)    (−0.33)    (−0.29) 
ΔBTM   −0.0036 −0.0037   −0.0004 0.0000   0.0095 −0.0972 
   (−1.40) (−1.45)   (−0.10) (0.01)   (0.70) (−2.79) 
ΔBTM2    0.0062    −0.0052    0.1032 
    (1.62)    (−0.94)    (2.27) 
ΔBeta   0.0083*** 0.0054**   0.0010 −0.0024   0.0121 −0.0025 
   (3.28) (2.06)   (0.30) (−0.79)   (1.48) (−0.59) 
ΔBeta2    0.0027    −0.0122    0.0151 
    (0.61)    (−1.71)    (1.65) 
ΔIlliq   0.0003 −0.0002   0.0049 0.0037   0.0289 0.0607* 
   (0.14) (−0.07)   (1.39) (1.03)   (2.39) (3.54) 
ΔIlliq2    0.0041    0.0141**    0.0446 
    (0.80)    (2.88)    (1.63) 
ΔMom   −0.0012 −0.0010   0.0006 −0.0070   0.0032 0.0043 
   (−0.34) (−0.28)   (0.15) (−1.56)   (0.84) (0.83) 
ΔMom2    0.0076    0.0059    −0.0067 
    (1.21)    (1.33)    (−0.22) 
ΔIVOL   −0.0021 −0.0024   −0.0071 0.0002   −0.0210* −0.0269* 
   (−0.77) (−0.88)   (−1.60) (0.04)   (−3.68) (−2.94) 
ΔIVOL2    0.0041    −0.0001    0.0089 
    (1.02)    (−0.02)    (1.62) 
N  1,264 1,264 1,264  524 524 524  144 144 144 
Adjusted R
2
  0.000 0.002 0.003  0.000 0.000 0.001  0.000 0.043 0.034 
Wealth Relative  0.98 1.01 0.78  0.89 0.93 0.91  1.04 1.40 1.11 
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Table 13 
Difference-in-differences regression for non-U.S. bank M&As  
This table summarizes the difference-in-differences (DD) regression results for a sample of 195 completed non-
U.S. bank mergers announced between 1990 and 2014. The dependent variable in each regression is the bidder, 
target or combined three-day CARs centered on the announcement day. Non-U.S. represents the full sample, 
where both bidders and targets are non-U.S. firms. EU represents the sub-sample where both bidders and targets 
are located in the EU-15 plus Norway and Switzerland. In each regression, we include the same control 
variables as in Table 4. All independent variables are defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at 2% and 98% level. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The symbols 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
   Bidder   Target   Combined 
Variables   Non-U.S. EU   Non-U.S. EU   Non-U.S. EU 
Constant   −0.083* −0.084   0.203 0.832***   −0.024 −0.024 
   (−1.81) (−1.33)   (1.51) (3.05)   (−0.78) (−0.50) 
DFA   0.007 0.008   0.078* 0.057   0.005 0.008 
   (0.61) (0.43)   (1.88) (0.48)   (0.54) (0.47) 
Small   0.024 0.069*   −0.033 −0.194**   −0.006 0.013 
   (1.07) (1.85)   (−0.78) (−2.37)   (−0.34) (0.65) 
DFA·Small   −0.007 −0.035   −0.045 0.063   0.025 0.031 
   (−0.32) (−0.97)   (−0.74) (0.41)   (1.21) (1.13) 
Control Variables   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
N   195 94   195 94   195 94 
Adjusted R
2
   0.033 0.042   0.115 0.205   0.004 0.011 
 
